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The Logic and Limits of Event Studies
in Securities Fraud Litigation

Jill E. Fisch,* Jonah B. Gelbach,** and Jonathan Klick***
Event studies have become increasingly important in securities fraud
litigation, and the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. heightened their importance by holding that the results of event
studies could be used to obtain or rebut the presumption of reliance at the class
certification stage. As a result, getting event studies right has become critical.
Unfortunately, courts and litigants widely misunderstand the event study
methodology leading, as in Halliburton, to conclusions that differ from the stated
standard.
This Article provides a primer explaining the event study methodology and
identifying the limitations on its use in securities fraud litigation. It begins by
describing the basic function of the event study and its foundations in financial
economics. The Article goes on to identify special features of securities fraud
litigation that cause the statistical properties of event studies to differ from those
in the scholarly context in which event studies were developed. Failure to adjust
the standard approach to reflect these special features can lead an event study
to produce conclusions inconsistent with the standards courts intend to apply.
Using the example of the Halliburton litigation, we illustrate the use of these
adjustments and demonstrate how they affect the results in that case.
The Article goes on to highlight the limitations of event studies and explains
how those limitations relate to the legal issues for which they are introduced.
These limitations bear upon important normative questions about the role event
studies should play in securities fraud litigation.
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Introduction
In June 2014, on its second trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, Halliburton
scored a partial victory. 1 Halliburton failed to persuade the Supreme Court to
overrule its landmark decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,2 which had approved
the fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) presumption of reliance in private
securities fraud litigation. 3 It did, however, persuade the Court to allow
1. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
3. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
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defendants to introduce evidence of lack of price impact at class
certification. 4 As the Court explained, Basic “does not require courts to
ignore a defendant’s direct, . . . salient evidence showing that the alleged
misrepresentation did not actually affect the stock’s market price and,
consequently, that the Basic presumption does not apply.” 5
The concept of price impact 6 is a critical component of securities fraud
litigation. Although Halliburton II considered price impact only in the
context of determining plaintiffs’ reliance on fraudulent statements, price
impact is critical to other elements of securities fraud, including loss
causation, materiality, and damages. The challenge is how to determine
whether fraudulent statements have affected stock price. This task is not
trivial—stock prices fluctuate continuously in response to a variety of issuer
and market developments as well as “noise” trading. To address the question,
litigants use event studies. 7
Event studies have their origins in the academic literature. 8 Financial
economists use event studies to measure the relationship between stock prices
and various types of events. 9 The core contribution of the event study is its
ability to differentiate between price fluctuations that reflect the range of
typical variation for a security and a highly unusual price impact that often
may reasonably be inferred from a highly unusual price movement that
occurs immediately after an event and has no other potential causes. 10

4. Id.
5. Id. at 2416.
6. Fraudulent information has price impact if, in the counterfactual world in which the
disclosures were accurate, the price of the security would have been different. One of us has used
the related term “price distortion” to encompass both fraudulent information that moves the market
price and information that distorts the market by concealing the truth. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with
Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 897 n.8 (2013).
7. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“Use of an
event study or similar analysis is necessary . . . to isolate the influences of [the allegedly fraudulent]
information . . . .”).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 173 n.29 (3d Cir. 2010) (“An event study . . .
‘is a statistical regression analysis that examines the effect of an event [such as the release of
information] on a depend[e]nt variable, such as a corporation’s stock price.’” (quoting In re Apollo
Group Inc. Sec. Litig., 509 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (D. Ariz. 2007))).
9. See generally S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies (describing
the event study literature and conducting census of event studies published in five journals for the
years 1974 through 2000), in 1 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE F INANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE
FINANCE 3 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007).
10. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling
Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & F IN. 183,
194 (2009) (citing DAVID T ABAK, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, MAKING ASSESSMENTS ABOUT
MATERIALITY LESS SUBJECTIVE T HROUGH THE USE OF CONTENT ANALYSIS 4 (2007),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/PUB_Tabak_Content_Analysis_SE
C1646-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/768L-FPGQ]) (explaining the role of event studies in
identifying an “unusual” price movement).
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Use of the event study methodology has become ubiquitous in securities
fraud litigation.11 Indeed, many courts have concluded that the use of an event
study is preferred or even required to establish one or more of the necessary
elements of the plaintiffs’ case.12 But event studies present challenges in
securities fraud litigation. First, it is unclear that courts fully understand event
study methodology. For example, Justice Alito asked counsel for the
petitioner at oral argument in Halliburton II:
Can I ask you a question about these event studies to which you
referred? How accurately can they distinguish between . . . the effect
on price of the facts contained in a disclosure and an irrational reaction
by the market, at least temporarily, to the facts contained in the
disclosure?13
Counsel responded to Justice Alito’s question by stating that: “Event studies
are very effective at making that sort of determination.”14 In reality, however,
event studies can do no more than demonstrate highly unusual price changes.
Event studies do not speak to the rationality of those price changes.
Second, event studies only measure the movement of a stock price in
response to the release of unanticipated, material information. In
circumstances in which fraudulent statements falsely confirm prior
statements, the stock price would not be expected to move. 15 Event studies
are not capable of measuring the effect of these so-called confirmatory
disclosures on stock price.16 Similarly, in cases involving multiple “bundled”
disclosures, event studies have limited capacity to identify the particular
contribution of each piece of information or the degree to which the effects
of multiple disclosures may offset each other.17

11. See, e.g., Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power,
Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583, 585 (2015) (observing that “event studies
became so entrenched in securities litigation that they are viewed as necessary in every case”
(footnotes omitted)).
12. See, e.g., Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC,
752 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2014) (“The usual—it is fair to say ‘preferred’—method of proving loss
causation in a securities fraud case is through an event study . . . .”).
13. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 665–66 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“[C]onfirmatory information has already been digested by the market and will not cause a change
in stock price.”).
16. As we discuss below, courts have responded to this limitation by allowing plaintiffs to show
price impact indirectly through event studies that show a price drop on the date of an alleged
corrective disclosure. See, e.g., In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 259 (2d Cir. 2016)
(rejecting “Vivendi’s position that an alleged misstatement must be associated with an increase in
inflation to have a ‘price impact’”).
17. This sort of problem, which we discuss below, has arisen in cases; see, e.g., Archdiocese of
Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02–CV–1152–M, 2008 WL 4791492,
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Third, there are important differences between the scholarly contexts for
which event studies were originally designed and the use of event studies in
securities fraud litigation. For example, academics originally designed the
event study methodology to measure the effect of a single event across
multiple firms, the effects of multiple events at a single firm, or the effects of
multiple events at multiple firms. 18 By contrast, an event study used in
securities fraud litigation typically requires evaluating the impact of
individual events on a single firm’s stock price. 19 These differences have
important methodological implications. In addition, determining whether to
characterize a price movement as highly unusual is the product of
methodological choices, including choices about the level of statistical
significance and thus statistical power. In the securities litigation context,
those choices have normative implications that courts have not considered. 20
They also may have implications that are inconsistent with governing legal
standards.21
In this Article, we examine the use of the event study methodology in
securities fraud litigation. Part I demonstrates why the concept of a highly
unusual price movement is central to a variety of legal issues in securities
fraud litigation. Part II explains how event studies work. Part III conducts a
stylized event study using data from the Halliburton litigation.22 Part IV
identifies the special features of securities fraud litigation that require
at *11 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008) (explaining that Halliburton’s Dec. 7, 2001 disclosure contained
“two distinct components,” a corrective disclosure of prior misstatements and new negative
information, and denying class certification because plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that it
was more probable than not that the stock price decline was caused by the former); cf. Esther
Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response
Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 25 (2009) (explaining that “‘content analysis’ is now part of the tool
kit for determining which among a number of simultaneous news events had effects on the stock
price”); Alex Rinaudo & Atanu Saha, An Intraday Event Study Methodology for Determining Loss
Causation, J. FIN. PERSP., July 2014, at 161, 162–63 (explaining how the problem of multiple
disclosures can be partially addressed by using an intraday event methodology).
18. See, e.g., Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 586 (“[A]lmost all academic research event
studies are multi-firm event studies (MFESs) that examine large samples of securities from multiple
firms.”).
19. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm,
Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 495, 496–97 (2013) (explaining that securities fraud
litigation requires the use of single-firm event studies).
20. See, e.g., In re Intuitive Surgical Sec. Litig., No. 5:13-cv-01920-EJD, 2016 WL 7425926,
at *15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (considering plaintiff’s argument that “price impact at a 90%
confidence level is a statistically significant” effect but ultimately rejecting it because there was “no
reason to deviate” from the 95% confidence level adopted by another court).
21. See infra Part V.
22. Halliburton announced on December 23, 2016, that it had agreed to a proposed settlement
of the case for $100 million pending court approval. Nate Raymond, Halliburton Shareholder Class
Action to Settle for $100 Million, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushalliburton-lawsuit/halliburton-shareholder-class-action-to-settle-for-100-millionidUSKBN14C2BD [https://perma.cc/JS9M-DJDD].
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adjustments to the standard event study approach and demonstrates how a
failure to incorporate these features can lead to conclusions inconsistent with
the standards intended by courts. Part V highlights methodological
limitations of event studies—i.e., what they can and cannot prove. It also
raises questions about whether the 5% significance level typically used in
securities litigation is appropriate in light of legal standards of proof. Finally,
this Part touches on normative implications that flow from the use of this
demanding significance level.
A review of judicial use of event studies raises troubling questions about
the capacity of the legal system to incorporate social science methodology,
as well as whether there is a mismatch between this methodology and
governing legal standards. Our analysis demonstrates that the proper use of
event studies in securities fraud litigation requires care, both in a better
understanding of the event study methodology and in an appreciation of its
limits.
I.

The Role of Event Studies in Securities Litigation

In this Part, we take a systematic look at the different questions that
event studies might answer in a securities fraud case. 23 As noted above, the
use of event studies in securities fraud litigation is widespread. As litigants
and courts have become familiar with the methodology, they have used event
studies to address a variety of legal issues.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson marked the
starting point. In Basic, the Court accepted the FOTM presumption which
holds that “the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets
reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations.”24 The Court observed that the typical investor, in
“buy[ing] or sell[ing] stock at the price set by the market[,] does so in reliance
on the integrity of that price.” 25 As a result, the Court concluded that an
investor’s reliance could be presumed for purposes of a 10b-5 claim if the
following requirements were met: (i) the misrepresentations were publicly
known; (ii) “the misrepresentations were material”; (iii) the stock was
“traded [i]n an efficient market”; and (iv) “the plaintiff traded . . . between

23. To succeed on a federal securities fraud claim, the plaintiff must establish the following
elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind;
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance . . . ; (5) economic loss; and
(6) ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.”
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (cleaned up).
24. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
25. Id. at 247.
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the time the misrepresentations were made and . . . [when] the truth was
revealed.” 26
The Court’s decision in Basic was influenced by a law review article by
Professor Daniel Fischel of the University of Chicago Law School. 27 Fischel
argued that FOTM offered a more coherent approach to securities fraud than
then-existing practice because it recognized the market model of the
investment decision. 28 Although Basic focused on the reliance requirement,
Fischel argued that the only relevant inquiry in a securities fraud case was
the extent to which market prices were distorted by fraudulent information—
it was unnecessary for the court to make separate inquiries into materiality,
reliance, causation, and damages.29 Moreover, Fischel stated that the effect
of fraudulent conduct on market price could be determined through a blend
of financial economics and applied statistics. Although Fischel did not use
the term “event study” in this article, he described the event study
methodology.30
The lower courts initially responded to the Basic decision by focusing
extensively on the efficiency of the market in which the securities traded. 31
The leading case on market efficiency, Cammer v. Bloom,32 involved a fivefactor test:
(1) the stock’s average weekly trading volume; (2) the number of
securities analysts that followed and reported on the stock; (3) the
presence of market makers and arbitrageurs; (4) the company’s
eligibility to file a Form S-3 Registration Statement; and (5) a causeand-effect relationship, over time, between unexpected corporate
events or financial releases and an immediate response in stock
price.33
Economists serving as expert witnesses generally use event studies to
address the fifth Cammer factor.34 In this context, the event study is used to

26. Id. at 248 n.27.
27. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982).
28. Id. at 2, 9–10.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 17–18.
31. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 911 (explaining how, after Basic, the majority of challenges to
class certification involved challenges of “the efficiency of the market in which the securities
traded”).
32. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
33. DAVID T ABAK, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, DO COURTS COUNT CAMMER F ACTORS? 2
(2012) (quoting In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 2005)),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_Cammer_Factors_0812.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75TK-4B4Z].
34. See Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 207
(2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the fifth Cammer factor—which requires evidence tending to

FISCH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

560

2/6/2018 11:05 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:553

determine the extent to which the market for a particular stock responds to
new information. Experts generally look at multiple information or news
events—some relevant to the litigation in question and some not—and
evaluate the extent to which these events are associated with price changes
in the expected directions. 35
A number of commentators have questioned the centrality of market
efficiency to the Basic presumption, disputing either the extent to which the
market is as efficient as presumed by the Basic court36 or the relevance of
market efficiency altogether. 37 Financial economists do not consider the
Cammer factors to be reliable for purposes of establishing market efficiency
in academic research. 38 Nonetheless, it has become common practice for both
plaintiffs and defendants to submit event studies that address the extent to
which the market price of the securities in question respond to publicly
reported events for the purpose of addressing Basic’s requirement that the
securities were traded in an efficient market. 39
Basic signaled a broader potential role for event studies, however. By
focusing on the harm resulting from a misrepresentation’s effect on stock
price rather than on the autonomy of investors’ trading decisions, Basic
distanced federal securities litigation from the individualized tort of common
law fraud.40 In this sense, Basic was transformative—it introduced a market-

demonstrate that unexpected corporate events or financial releases cause an immediate response in
the price of a security—is the most important indicator of market efficiency). But see TABAK, supra
note 33, at 2–3 (providing evidence that courts are simply “counting” the Cammer factors).
35. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415
(2014) (“EPJ Fund submitted an event study of various episodes that might have been expected to
affect the price of Halliburton’s stock, in order to demonstrate that the market for that stock takes
account of material, public information about the company.”).
36. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality,
Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) (citing
“substantial disagreement . . . about to what degree markets are efficient, how to test for efficiency,
and even the definition of efficiency”). See also Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price
Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20
(1994) (“[O]verwhelming empirical evidence suggests that capital markets are not fundamentally
efficient.”). Notably, Lev and de Villiers concede that markets are likely information-efficient,
which is the predicate requirement for FOTM. See id. at 21 (“While capital markets are in all
likelihood not fundamentally efficient, widely held and heavily traded securities are probably
‘informationally efficient.’”).
37. Fisch, supra note 6, at 898 (“[M]arket efficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition to establish that misinformation has distorted prices . . . .”); see, e.g., Brief of Law
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4–5, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (arguing that inquiry into market
efficiency to show reliance was “unnecessary and counterproductive”).
38. Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 601.
39. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415 (explaining that both plaintiffs and defendants
introduce event studies at the class certification stage for the purpose of addressing market
efficiency).
40. See generally Fisch, supra note 6, at 913–14.
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based approach to federal securities fraud litigation. 41 Price impact is a
critical component of this approach because absent an impact on stock price,
plaintiffs who trade in reliance on the market price are not defrauded. As the
Supreme Court subsequently noted in Halliburton II, “[i]n the absence of
price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and presumption of reliance
collapse.” 42
The importance of price impact extends beyond the reliance
requirement. In Dura Pharmaceuticals,43 the plaintiffs, relying on Basic,
filed a complaint in which they alleged that at the time they purchased Dura
stock, its price had been artificially inflated due to Dura’s alleged
misstatements.44 The Supreme Court reasoned that while artificial price
inflation at the time of the plaintiffs’ purchase might address the reliance
requirement, plaintiffs were also required to plead and prove the separate
element of loss causation. 45 Key to the Court’s reasoning was that purchasing
at an artificially inflated price did not automatically cause economic harm
because an investor might purchase at an artificially inflated price and
subsequently sell while the price was still inflated. 46
Following Dura, courts allowed plaintiffs to establish loss causation in
various ways, but the standard approach involved the use of an event study
“to demonstrate both that the economic loss occurred and that this loss was
proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentation.” 47 Practically
speaking, plaintiffs in the post-Dura era need to plead price impact both at
the time of the misrepresentation48 and on the alleged corrective disclosure
date. However, in Halliburton I,49 the Supreme Court explained that plaintiffs
do not need to prove loss causation to avail themselves of the Basic
presumption since this presumption has to do with “transaction causation”—
the decision to buy the stock in the first place, which occurs before any
evidence of loss causation could exist. 50

41. Id. at 916.
42. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414.
43. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
44. Id. at 339–40.
45. Id. at 346. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) codified the loss
causation requirement that had previously been developed by lower courts. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)
(1995); see Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 811, 813 (2009) (describing judicial development of the loss causation requirement).
46. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–43.
47. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 10, at 198.
48. The former requirement is not necessary in cases involving confirmatory disclosures. See
infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text (discussing confirmatory disclosures).
49. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804 (2011).
50. Id. at 812. As to the merits, though, plaintiffs must also demonstrate a causal link between
the two events—the initial misstatement and the corrective disclosure. See, e.g., Aranaz v. Catalyst
Pharm. Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 671–72 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (describing and rejecting defendants’
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Plaintiffs responded to Dura’s loss causation requirement by presenting
event studies showing that the stock price declined in response to an issuer’s
corrective disclosure. As the First Circuit recently explained: “The usual—it
is fair to say ‘preferred’—method of proving loss causation in a securities
fraud case is through an event study . . . .”51
Proof of price impact for purposes of analyzing reliance and causation
also overlaps with the materiality requirement. 52 The Court has defined
material information as information that has a substantial likelihood to be
“viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information made available.”53 Because market prices are a reflection
of investors’ trading decisions, information that is relevant to those trading
decisions has the capacity to impact stock prices, and similarly, information
that does not affect stock prices is arguably immaterial. 54 As the Third Circuit
explained in Burlington Coat Factory:55 “In the context of an ‘efficient’
market, the concept of materiality translates into information that alters the
price of the firm’s stock.”56 Event studies can be used to demonstrate the
impact of fraudulent statements on stock price, providing evidence that
the statements are material. 57 The lower courts have, on occasion, accepted

argument that other information on the date of the alleged corrective disclosure was responsible for
the fall in stock price). Halliburton I was spawned because the district court had denied class
certification on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to persuade the court that there was such a causal
link (even though plaintiffs had presented an event study showing a price impact from the
misstatements). Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02–
CV–1152–M, 2008 WL 4791492, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008).
51. Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 752
F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2014).
52. See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 434–35 n.10 (5th Cir.
2013) (“[T]here is a fuzzy line between price impact evidence directed at materiality and price
impact evidence broadly directed at reliance.”).
53. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
54. See Fredrick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 509 (2006) (“The definition of immaterial information . . . is that it is
already known or . . . does not have a statistically significant effect on stock price in an efficient
market.”). But cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 173–77 (2009) (arguing that in some cases material information may not affect
stock prices).
55. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997).
56. Id. at 1425.
57. See, e.g., In re Sadia, S.A. Sec. Litig., 269 F.R.D. 298, 302, 311 & n.104, 316 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (finding that the plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence—among which was an event study
conducted by an expert witness—to conclude that the defendant’s misstatements were material); In
re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 5567(RPP), 2000 WL 193125, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2000) (describing the event study as “an accepted method for the evaluation of materiality damages
to a class of stockholders in a defendant corporation”).
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the argument that the absence of price impact demonstrates the immateriality
of alleged misrepresentations.58
A statement can be immaterial because it is unimportant or because it
conveys information that is already known to the market. 59 The latter
argument is known as the “truth on the market” defense since the argument
is that the market already knew the truth. According to the truth-on-themarket defense, an alleged misrepresentation that occurs after the market
already knows the truth cannot change market perceptions of firm value
because any effect of the truth will already have been incorporated into the
market price.60
In Amgen,61 the parties agreed that the market for Amgen’s stock was
efficient and that the statements in question were public, but they disputed
the reasons why Amgen’s stock price had dropped on the alleged corrective
disclosure dates. 62 Specifically, the defendants argued that because the truth
regarding the alleged misrepresentations was publicly known before
plaintiffs purchased their shares, plaintiffs did not trade at a price that was
impacted by the fraud. 63 Although the majority in Amgen concluded that
proof of materiality was not required at the class certification stage, it
acknowledged that the defendant’s proffered truth-on-the-market evidence
could potentially refute materiality. 64

58. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 269, 273–75 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
a false disclosure is immaterial when there is “no negative effect” on a company’s stock price
directly following the disclosure’s publication); Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000)
(Alito, J.) (“[I]n an efficient market ‘the concept of materiality translates into information that alters
the price of the firm’s stock’ . . . .” (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1425)).
59. See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he truth-on-the-market defense is a method of refuting an alleged misrepresentation’s
materiality.” (emphasis omitted)).
60. See, e.g., Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 670–71 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(explaining that the defendants sought to show that because the market already “knew the truth,”
the price was not distorted by alleged misrepresentations).
61. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013).
62. Id. at 459, 464; see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Lead
Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at 23, Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., No.
CV 07-2536 PSG (PLAx), 2009 WL 2633743 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009):
Defendants have made a ‘showing’ both that information was publicly available and
that the market drops that Plaintiff relies on to establish loss causation were not caused
by the revelation of any allegedly concealed information. . . . Rather, as Defendants
have shown, the market was ‘privy’ to the truth, and the price drops were the result of
third-parties’ reactions to public information.
63. Amgen, 568 U.S. at 459, 464. As a lower court had put it, “FDA announcements and analyst
reports about Amgen’s business [had previously] publicized the truth about the safety issues
looming over Amgen’s drugs . . . .” Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 660 F.3d at 1177.
64. See Amgen, 568 U.S. at 481–82 (concluding that truth-on-the-market evidence is a matter
for trial or for a summary judgment motion, not for determining class certification).
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Proof of economic loss and damages also overlaps proof of loss
causation. For plaintiffs to recover damages, they must show that they
suffered an economic loss that was caused by the alleged fraud. 65 The 1934
Act provides that plaintiffs may recover actual damages, which must be
proved.66 A plaintiff who can prove damages has obviously proved she
sustained an economic loss. At the same time, a plaintiff who cannot prove
damages cannot prove she suffered an economic loss. Thus the economic loss
and damages elements merge into one. A number of courts have rejected
testimony or reports by damages experts that failed to include an event
study.67
Notably, while the price impact at the time of the fraud (required in order
to obtain the Basic presumption of reliance) is not the same as price impact
at the time of the corrective disclosures (loss causation under Dura),68 in
many cases, the parties may seek to address both elements with a single event
study. This is most common in cases that involve alleged fraudulent
confirmatory statements. Misrepresentations that falsely confirm market
expectations will not lead to an observable change in price.69 But this does
not mean they have no price impact. As the Second Circuit explained in
Vivendi,70 “a statement may cause inflation not simply by adding it to a stock,

65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2010). This provision places the burden of establishing loss
causation on the plaintiffs in any private securities fraud action brought under Chapter 2B of
Title 15. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) (“A private plaintiff who claims
securities fraud must prove that the defendant’s fraud caused an economic loss.” (citing § 78u4(b)(4))).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(1) (2012).
67. See, e.g., In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (“Because of the need ‘to distinguish between the fraud-related and non-fraud related
influences of the stock’s price behavior,’ a number of courts have rejected or refused to admit into
evidence damages reports or testimony by damages experts in securities cases which fail to include
event studies or something similar.” (quoting In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181
(N.D. Cal. 1993))); In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(terming expert’s testimony “fatally deficient in that he did not perform an event study or similar
analysis”); In re Exec. Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The
reliability of the Expert Witness’ proposed testimony is called into question by his failure to
indicate . . . whether he conducted an ‘event study’ . . . .”).
68. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804, 805 (2011)
(distinguishing between reliance and loss causation); see also Fisch, supra note 6, at 899 & n.20
(highlighting the distinction and terming the former ex ante price distortion and the latter ex post
price distortion).
69. See, e.g., FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A
corollary of the efficient market hypothesis is that disclosure of confirmatory information—or
information already known by the market—will not cause a change in the stock price. This is so
because the market has already digested that information and incorporated it into the price.”).
70. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016).
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but by maintaining it.”71 The relevant price impact is simply counterfactual:
the price would have fallen had there not been fraud. 72
In cases where plaintiffs allege confirmatory misrepresentations, event
study evidence has no probative value related to the alleged
misrepresentation dates since the plaintiffs’ own allegations predict no
change in price. Thus there will be no observed price impact on alleged
misrepresentation dates. However, a change in observed price will ultimately
occur when the fraud is revealed via corrective disclosures. That is why it is
appropriate to allow plaintiffs to use event studies concerning dates of alleged
corrective disclosures to establish price impact for cases involving
confirmatory alleged misrepresentations. A showing that the stock price
responded to a subsequent corrective disclosure can provide indirect
evidence of the counterfactual price impact of the alleged
misrepresentation. 73 Such a conclusion opens the door to consideration of the
type of event study conducted for purposes of loss causation, as we discuss
below.74
Halliburton II presented this scenario. Plaintiffs alleged that Halliburton
made a variety of fraudulent confirmatory disclosures that artificially
maintained the company’s stock price.75 Initially, defendants had argued that
the plaintiff could not establish loss causation because Halliburton’s
subsequent corrective disclosures did not impact the stock price. 76 When the
Supreme Court held in Halliburton I that the plaintiffs were not required to
prove loss causation on a motion for class certification, 77 “Halliburton argued
on remand that the evidence it had presented to disprove loss causation also
demonstrated that none of the alleged misrepresentations actually impacted
Halliburton’s stock price, i.e., there was a lack of ‘price impact,’ and,
therefore, Halliburton had rebutted the Basic presumption.” 78 Halliburton

71. Id. at 258.
72. The Vivendi court explained that “once a company chooses to speak, the proper question
for purposes of our inquiry into price impact is not what might have happened had a company
remained silent, but what would have happened if it had spoken truthfully.” Id.
73. See IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 818 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2016)
(noting the lower court’s reasoning that price impact can be shown when a revelation of fraud is
followed by a decrease in price); In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & Emp. Ret. Income
Sec. Act (ERISA) Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that stock price’s negative
reaction to corrective disclosure served to defeat defendant’s argument on lack of price impact).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 80–89.
75. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405–06
(2014).
76. Defendant Halliburton Co.’s Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth
Consol. Class Action Complaint at 22, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., No. 3:02–CV–1152–M, 2008 WL 4791492 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008).
77. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804, 813 (2011).
78. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 255–56 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
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attempted to present “extensive evidence of no price impact,” evidence that
the lower courts ruled was “not appropriately considered at class
certification.”79
The Supreme Court disagreed. In Halliburton II, Chief Justice Roberts
explained that the Court’s decision was not a bright-line choice between
allowing district courts to consider price impact evidence at class certification
or requiring them to consider the issue at a later point in trial; price impact
evidence from event studies was often already before the court at the class
certification stage because plaintiffs were using event studies to demonstrate
market efficiency, and defendants were using event studies to counter this
evidence.80 Under these circumstances, the Chief Justice concluded that
prohibiting a court from relying on this same evidence to evaluate whether
the fraud affected stock price “makes no sense.” 81
Because the question of price impact itself is unavoidably before the
Court upon a motion for class certification, the Chief Justice explained that
the Court’s actual choice concerned merely the type of evidence it would
allow parties to use in demonstrating price impact on the dates of alleged
misrepresentations or alleged corrective disclosures. “The choice . . . is
between limiting the price impact inquiry before class certification to indirect
evidence”—evidence directed at establishing market efficiency in general—
“or allowing consideration of direct evidence as well.” 82 The direct evidence
the Court’s majority determined to allow—concerning price impact on dates
of alleged misrepresentations and alleged corrective disclosures—will
typically be provided in the form of event studies.
On remand, the trial court considered the event study submitted by
Halliburton’s expert, which purported to find that neither the alleged
misrepresentations nor the corrective disclosures 83 identified by the plaintiff
impacted Halliburton’s stock price.84 After carefully considering the event
studies submitted by both parties, which addressed six corrective disclosures,
the court found that Halliburton had successfully demonstrated a lack of price

79. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 435 n.11 (5th Cir. 2013), vacated,
134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
80. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).
The Halliburton litigation provides an odd context in which to make this determination since
Halliburton had not disputed the efficiency of the public market in its stock. Archdiocese of
Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., 2008 WL 4791492, at *1.
81. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.
82. Id. at 2417.
83. As the court explained: “Measuring price change at the time of the corrective disclosure,
rather than at the time of the corresponding misrepresentation, allows for the fact that many alleged
misrepresentations conceal a truth.” Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 262.
84. Id. at 262–63. The court noted that the expert attributed the one date on which the stock
experienced a highly unusual price movement as a reaction to factors other than Halliburton’s
disclosure. Id.
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impact as to five of the dates and granted class certification with respect to
the December 7 alleged corrective disclosure. 85 For several dates, this
conclusion was based on the district court’s determination that the event
effects were statistically insignificant at the 5% significance level
(equivalently, at the 95% confidence level).86
Following Halliburton II, several other lower courts have considered
defendants’ use of event studies to demonstrate the absence of price impact.
In Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery v. Regions Financial Corp.,87 the court of
appeals concluded that the defendant had provided evidence that the stock
price did not change in light of the misrepresentations and that the trial court,
acting prior to Halliburton II, “did not fully consider this evidence.”88
Accordingly, the court vacated and “remand[ed] for fuller consideration . . .
of all the price-impact evidence submitted below.” 89 On remand, defendants
argued that they had successfully rebutted the Basic presumption by
providing evidence of no price impact on both the misrepresentation date and
the date of the corrective disclosure. 90 The trial court disagreed. The court
reasoned that the defendants’ own expert conceded that the 24% decline in
the issuer’s stock on the date of the corrective disclosure was far greater than
the New York Stock Exchange’s 6.1% decline that day and that given this
discrepancy the defense had not shown the absence of price impact. 91 This
decision places the burden of persuasion concerning price impact squarely on
the defendants.92
In Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharmaceutical Partners Inc.,93 the district court
permitted the defendant an opportunity to rebut price impact at class
certification. 94 The Aranaz court explained, however, that the defendant was
limited to direct evidence that the alleged misrepresentations had no impact
on stock price. 95 The defendants conceded that the stock price rose by 42%

85. Id. at 280.
86. Id. at 270.
87. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d
1248 (11th Cir. 2014).
88. Id. at 1258.
89. Id. at 1258–59.
90. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV–
10–J–2847–S, 2014 WL 6661918, at *5–9 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014).
91. Id. at *8–10. Defendants argued that their expert’s event study “conclusively finds no price
impact on January 20, 2009,” the date of the alleged disclosure. Id. at *8.
92. See Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on What Defendants Need to Show to
Establish No Impact on Price, 70 BUS. L AW. 437, 449, 463 (2015) (describing the resulting
statistical burden this approach would impose on defendants to rebut the presumption).
93. 302 F.R.D. 657 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
94. Id. at 669–73.
95. Id. at 670 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197
(2013)). Under Halliburton I and Amgen, this limit is appropriate. The district court in Halliburton
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on the date of the allegedly misleading press release and fell by 42% on the
date of the corrective disclosure 96 but argued that other statements in the two
publications caused the “drastic changes in stock price.” 97 The court
concluded that because the defendant had the burden of proving that “price
impact is inconsistent with the results of their analysis,”98 their evidence was
not sufficient to show an absence of price impact. This determination as to
the burden of persuasion tracks the approach taken by the Local 703 court
discussed above. Further, following Amgen, the Aranaz court ruled that the
truth-on-the-market defense would not defeat class certification because it
concerns materiality and not price impact. 99
The lower court decisions following Halliburton II demonstrate the
growing importance of event studies. The most recent trial court decision as
to class certification in the Halliburton litigation itself100 demonstrates as well
the challenges for the court in evaluating the event study methodology, an
issue we will consider in more detail in Part III below.
Significantly, as reflected in the preceding discussion, proof of price
impact is relevant to multiple elements of securities fraud. A single event
study may provide evidence relating to materiality, reliance, loss causation,
economic loss, and damages. Although such evidence might be insufficient
on its own to prove one or more of these elements, event study evidence that
negates any of the first three elements implies that plaintiffs will be unable
to establish entitlement to damages. These observations explain why event
studies play such a central role in securities fraud litigation.
Loss causation and price impact have taken center stage at the pleading
and class certification stages. If the failure to establish price impact is fatal to

took the same approach on remand following Halliburton II. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 261–62 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (“This Court holds that Amgen and
Halliburton I strongly suggest that the issue of whether disclosures are [actually] corrective is not a
proper inquiry at the certification stage. Basic presupposes that a misrepresentation is reflected in
the market price at the time of the transaction.” (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014)). And “at this stage of the proceedings, the Court
concludes that the asserted misrepresentations were, in fact, misrepresentations, and assumes that
the asserted corrective disclosures were corrective of the alleged misrepresentations.” The court
continued to explain that “[w]hile it may be true that a finding that a particular disclosure was not
corrective as a matter of law would” break “‘the link between the alleged misrepresentation and . . .
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff . . . ,’ the Court is unable to unravel such a finding from
the materiality inquiry.” (quoting Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415–16)).
96. Aranaz, 302 F.R.D. at 669.
97. Id. at 671.
98. Id. at 672.
99. Id. at 671 (citing Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1203).
100. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 251. The parties subsequently agreed to a class settlement,
and the district court issued an order preliminarily approving that settlement, pending a fairness
hearing. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-01152-M, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2017).
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the plaintiffs’ case, the defendants benefit by making that challenge at the
pleading stage, before the plaintiffs can obtain discovery,101 or by preventing
plaintiffs from obtaining the leverage of class certification. 102 Accordingly,
much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on loss causation and price
impact has been decided in the context of pretrial motions.
Basic itself was decided on a motion for class certification. A key factor
in the Court’s analysis was the critical role that a presumption of reliance
would play in enabling the plaintiff to address Rule 23’s commonality
requirement.103 As the Court explained, “[r]equiring proof of individualized
reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would
have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since
individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”104 By
facilitating class certification, Basic has been described as transforming
private securities fraud litigation. 105
Defendants have responded by attempting to increase the burden
imposed on the plaintiff to obtain class certification. In Halliburton I, the
lower courts accepted defendant’s argument that plaintiffs should be required
to establish loss causation at class certification. 106 In Amgen, the defendants
argued that the plaintiff should be required to establish materiality in order to
obtain class certification.107 Notably, in both cases, the defendants’ objective
was to require the plaintiffs to prove price impact through an event study at
a preliminary stage in the litigation rather than at the merits stage.
Similarly, the Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals was issued in
the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 108 The complaint
ran afoul of even the pre-Twombly 109 pleading standard by failing to allege
that there had been any corrective disclosure associated with a loss. 110 The
101. Under the PSLRA, “all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the
pendency of any motion to dismiss” subject to narrow exceptions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B)
(2010).
102. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (Justice Scalia: “Once you get the class
certified, the case is over, right?”).
103. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242–43, 249 (1988).
104. Id. at 242.
105. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 54, at 152 (“Tens of billions of dollars have changed
hands in settlements of 10b-5 lawsuits in the last twenty years as a result of Basic.”).
106. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 344
(5th Cir. 2010); Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV1152-M, 2008 WL 4791492, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008).
107. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 459 (2013).
108. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 339–40 (2005).
109. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
110. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347 (“[T]he complaint nowhere . . . provides the defendants with notice
of what the relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal connection might be between that
loss and the misrepresentation concerning Dura’s [product].”).
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Dura Court held that the plaintiffs’ failure to plead loss causation meant that
the complaint did not show entitlement to relief as required under
Rule 8(a)(2).111 In the post-Dura state of affairs, plaintiffs must identify both
alleged misrepresentation and corrective disclosure dates to adequately plead
loss causation. They would also be well-advised to allege that an expert-run
event study establishes materiality, reliance, loss causation, economic loss,
and damages. Failure to do so would not necessarily be fatal, but it would
leave plaintiffs vulnerable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Given the
importance of the event study in securities litigation, it is important to
understand both the methodology involved and its limitations.
II.

The Theory of Financial Economics and the Practice of Event Studies:
An Overview
The theory of financial economics adopted by courts for purposes of
securities litigation is based on the premise that publicly released information
concerning a security’s price will be incorporated into its market price
quickly.112 This premise is known in financial economics as the semi-strong
form of the “efficient market” hypothesis,113 but we will refer to it simply as
the efficient market hypothesis. Under the efficient market hypothesis,
information that overstates a firm’s value will quickly inflate the firm’s stock
price over the level that true conditions warrant. Conversely, information that
corrects such inflationary misrepresentations will quickly lead the stock price
to fall.
Financial economists began using event studies to measure how much
stock prices respond to various types of news. 114 Typically, event studies
focus not on the level of a stock’s price, but on the percentage change in stock
price, which is known as the stock’s observed “return.” In its simplest form,
an event study compares a stock’s return on a day when news of interest hits
the market to the range of returns typically observed for that stock, taking
account of what would have been expected given general changes in the
overall market on that day. For example, if a stock typically moves up or

111. Id. at 346; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
112. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–47 (1988) (“[T]he market price of shares traded
on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations.”).
113. There are also strong and weak forms. The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis
holds that even information that is held only privately is reflected in stock prices since those with
the information can be expected to trade on it. ROBERT L. HAGIN, T HE DOW JONES-IRWIN GUIDE
TO MODERN PORTFOLIO T HEORY 12 (1979). The weak form holds only that “historical price data
are efficiently digested and, therefore, are useless for predicting subsequent stock price changes.”
Id.
114. For a history of the use of event studies in academic scholarship, see A. Craig MacKinlay,
Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13, 13–14 (1997).
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down by no more than 1% in either direction but rises by 2% on a date of
interest (after controlling for relevant market conditions), then the stock
return moved an unusual amount on that date. What range is “typical,” and
thus how large must a return be to be considered sufficiently unusual, are
questions that event study authors answer using statistical significance
testing.
A typical event study has five basic steps: (1) identify one or more
appropriate event dates, (2) calculate the security’s return on each event date,
(3) determine the security’s expected return for each event date, (4) subtract
the actual return from the expected return to compute the excess return for
each event date, and (5) evaluate whether the resulting excess return is
statistically significant at a chosen level of statistical significance.115 We treat
these five steps in two sections.
A.

Steps (1)–(4): Estimating a Security’s Excess Return
Experts typically address the first step (selecting the event date) by using
the date on which the representation or disclosure was publicly made.116 For
purposes of public-market securities fraud, the information must be
communicated widely enough that the market price can be expected to react
to the information. 117 The second step (calculating a security’s actual return)
requires only public information about daily security prices. 118
The third step is to determine the security’s expected return on the event
date, given market conditions that might be expected to affect the firm’s price
even in the absence of the news at issue. Event study authors do this by using

115. Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate
Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 798 (2008).
116. The event study literature contains an extensive treatment of the appropriate choice of
event window, a topic that we do not consider in detail here. See Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The
Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW. 163, 167–68 (2007) (discussing factors affecting
choice of event window); Rinaudo & Saha, supra note 17, at 163 (observing that the typical event
window is a single day but advocating instead for an “intraday event study methodology relying on
minute-by-minute stock price data”). The choice of window may play a critical role in determining
the results of the event study. See, e.g., In re Intuitive Surgical Sec. Litig., No. 5:13-cv-01920-EJD,
2016 WL 7425926, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding the defendants’ expert’s usage of a
two-day window was inappropriate and going on to find that the defendants failed to rebut plaintiffs’
presumption of reliance).
117. In some cases, litigants may dispute whether information is sufficiently public to generate
a market reaction; in other situations, leakage of information before public announcement may
generate an earlier market reaction. See Sherman v. Bear Stearns Cos. (In re Bear Stearns Cos., Sec.,
Derivative, & ERISA Litig.), No. 09 Civ. 8161 (RWS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97784, at *20–23
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (describing various decisions analyzing the “leakage analysis”). These specialized
situations can be addressed by tailoring the choice of event date.
118. Recall that a security’s daily return on a particular date is the percentage change in the
security over the preceding date.
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statistical methods to separate out components of a security’s return that are
based on overall market conditions from the component due to firm-specific
information. Market conditions typically are measured using a broad index
of other stocks’ returns on each date considered in the event study or an index
of returns of other firms engaged in similar business (since firms engaged in
common business activities are likely to be affected by similar types of
information). To determine the expected return for the security in question,
an expert will estimate a regression model that controls for the returns to
market or industry stock indexes. 119 The estimated coefficients from this
model can then be used to measure the expected return for the firm in
question, given the performance of the index variables included in the model.
The fourth step is to calculate the “excess return,” 120 which one does by
subtracting the expected return from the actual return on the date in question.
Thus the excess return is the component of the actual return that cannot be
explained by market movements on the event date, given the regression
estimates described above. So the excess return measures the stock’s reaction
to whatever news occurred on the event date.
A positive excess return indicates that the firm’s stock increased more
than would be expected based on the statistical model. A negative excess
return indicates that the stock fell more than the model predicts it should
have. Figure 1 illustrates the calculation of excess returns from actual returns
and expected returns. The figure plots the stock’s actual daily return on the
vertical axis and its expected daily return on the horizontal axis. The
upwardly sloped straight line represents the collection of points where the
actual and expected returns are equal. The magnitude of the excess return at
a given point is the height between that point and the upwardly sloped straight
line. The point plotted with a circle lies above the line where actual and
expected returns are equal, so this point indicates a positive excess return. By
contrast, at the point plotted with a square, the actual return is below the line
where the actual and expected returns are equal, so the excess return is
negative.

119. As one pair of commentators has recently noted: “The failure to make adjustments for the
effect of market and industry moves nearly always dooms an analysis of securities prices in
litigation.” Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 590.
120. The term “abnormal return” is interchangeable with excess return. We use only “excess
return” in this Article in order to avoid confusing “abnormal returns” with non-normality in the
distribution of these returns.

FISCH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

2/6/2018 11:05 PM

The Logic & Limits of Event Studies

573

Figure 1: Illustrating the Calculation of Excess Returns
from Actual and Expected Returns

B.

Step (5): Statistical Significance Testing in an Event Study
Our fifth and final step is to determine whether the estimated excess
return is statistically significant at the chosen level of significance, which is
frequently the 5% level. The use of statistical significance testing is designed
to distinguish stock-price changes that are just the result of typical volatility
from those that are sufficiently unusual that they are likely a response to the
alleged corrective disclosure.
Tests of statistical significance all boil down to asking whether some
statistic’s observed value is far enough away from some baseline level one
would expect that statistic to take. For example, if one flips a fair coin 100
times, one should expect to see heads come up on roughly 50% of the flips,
so the baseline level of the heads share is 50%. The hypothesis that the coin
is fair, so that the chance of a heads is 50%, is an example of what statisticians
call a null hypothesis: a maintained assumption about the object of statistical
study that will be dropped only if the statistical evidence is sufficiently
inconsistent with the assumption.
Since one can expect random variation to affect the share of heads in
100 coin flips, most scholars would find it unreasonable to reject the null
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hypothesis that the coin is fair simply because one observes a heads share of,
say, 49% or 51%. Even though these results do not equal exactly the baseline
level, they are close enough that most applied statisticians would consider
this evidence too weak to reject the null hypothesis that the coin is fair. 121 On
the other hand, common sense and statistical methodology suggest that if
eighty-nine of 100 tosses yielded heads, it would be strong evidence that the
coin was biased toward heads. A finding of eighty-nine heads would cause
most scholars to reject the null hypothesis that the coin is fair.
Event study tests of whether a stock price moved in response to
information are similar to the coin toss example. They seek to determine
whether the stock’s excess return was highly unusual on the event date. The
null hypothesis in an event study is that the news at issue did not have any
price impact. Under this null hypothesis, the stock’s return should reflect only
the usual relationship between the stock and market conditions on the event
date. In other words, the stock’s return should be the expected return, together
with normal variation. Our baseline expectation for the stock’s excess return
is that it should be zero. Normal variation, however, will cause the stock’s
actual return to differ somewhat from the expected return. Statistical
significance testing focuses on whether this deviation—the actual excess
return on the event date—is highly unusual.
What counts as highly unusual in securities litigation? Typically courts
and experts have treated an event-date effect as statistically significant if the
event-date’s excess return is among the 5% most extreme values one would
expect to observe in the absence of any fraudulent activity. 122 In this situation,

121. At the same time, observing a heads share of 49% does provide some weak evidence that
the coin is biased toward tails. A simple way to quantify that evidence is to use a result based on
Bayes’ theorem, according to which the posterior odds in favor of a proposition equal the product
of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio. See, e.g., David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh, Reference
Guide on DNA Identification Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 129, 173
(3d ed. 2011) (describing Bayes’ theorem). Whatever the prior odds that the coin in favor of a true
heads probability equal to 0.49, the likelihood ratio in favor of this proposition will exceed 1 since
the observed data are more likely when the heads probability is 0.49 than when it is 0.5. When the
likelihood ratio exceeds 1, the posterior odds exceed the prior odds, so the data provide some support
for the alternative hypothesis of a coin that is slightly biased toward tails. A more complete
discussion of this issue would have to address the question of the prior probability distribution over
non-fair heads probabilities, which involves replacing the numerator of the likelihood ratio with its
average over the prior distribution (the resulting ratio is known as the Bayes factor). The dominant
approach to applied statistics among scholars, and certainly among experts in litigation, is the
frequentist approach, which is usually hostile to the specification of priors. That is why frequentists
focus on statistical significance testing rather than reporting posterior odds or probabilities. Further
details are beyond the scope of the present Article.
122. See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 262 (N.D. Tex.
2015) (“To show that a corrective disclosure had a negative impact on a company’s share price,
courts generally require a party’s expert to testify based on an event study that meets the 95%
confidence standard . . . .” This standard requires that “one can reject with 95% confidence the null
hypothesis that the corrective disclosure had no impact on price.”) (citing Fox, supra note 92, at 442

FISCH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

The Logic & Limits of Event Studies

2/6/2018 11:05 PM

575

experts equivalently say that there is statistically significant evidence at the
5% level, or “at level 0.05,” or “with 95% confidence.” 123
Implicit in this discussion of statistical significance is the scholarly norm
of declaring that evidence that disfavors a null hypothesis is not strong
enough to reject that hypothesis. Thus, applied statisticians often say that a
statistically insignificant estimate is not necessarily proof that the null
hypothesis is true—just that the evidence isn’t strong enough to declare it
false. Such statisticians really have three categories of conclusion: that the
evidence is strong enough to reject the null hypothesis, that the evidence is
basically consistent with the null hypothesis, and that the evidence is
inconsistent with the null hypothesis but not so much as to warrant rejection
of the null hypothesis. One might think of such statisticians who use
demanding significance levels such as the 5% level as starting with a strong
presumption in favor of the null hypothesis so that only strong evidence
against it will be deemed sufficient to reject the null hypothesis.
Whether an approach of adopting a strong presumption in favor of the
defendant is consistent with legal standards in securities litigation is beyond
the scope of this Article but it is a topic that warrants future discussion. 124 For
purposes of this Article, though, we take the choice of the 5% significance
level as given and seek to provide courts with the methodological knowledge
necessary to apply that significance level properly. 125
Experts typically assume that in the absence of any fraud-related event,
a stock’s excess returns—that is, the typical variability not driven by the news
at issue in litigation—will follow a normal distribution, 126 an issue we discuss
in more detail in Part IV. For a random variable that follows a normal
n.17); cf. Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 596–99 (questioning whether requiring statistical
significance at the 95% confidence level for securities fraud event studies is appropriate). The
genesis of the 5% significance level is most probably its use by R.A. Fisher in his influential
textbook. See R.A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS 45, 85 (F.A.E. Crew
& D. Ward Cutler eds., 5th ed. 1934).
123. That is not to say that the event study can determine whether this price effect is rational in
the substantive sense that Justice Alito seems to have had in mind. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 24, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13317) (asking whether event studies can determine market irrationality). The measured price impact
represented by the excess return is simply the effect that is empirically evident from investor
behavior in the relevant financial market.
124. For a discussion of some of these issues outside the securities litigation context, see
Michelle M. Burtis, Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Error Costs, Legal Standards of
Proof and Statistical Significance 2–7, 9–14 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 1721, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2956471 [https://perma.cc/FRJ3-FNX7].
125. Daubert requires at least this much. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
590–91 n.9 (1993) (equating evidentiary reliability of scientific testimony with scientific validity
and defining scientific validity as the requirement that a “principle support[s] what it purports to
show”).
126. See, e.g., Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 591 n.17 (“[S]tandard practice still rests heavily
on the normality assumption . . . .”).
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distribution, 95% of realizations of that variable will take on a value that is
within 1.96 standard deviations of zero. 127 Experts assuming normality of
excess returns and using the 95% confidence level often determine that the
excess return is highly unusual if it is greater than 1.96 standard deviations.
For example, if the standard deviation of a stock’s excess returns is 1.5%, an
expert might declare an event date’s excess return statistically significant
only if it is more than 2.94 percentage points from zero. 128 In this example,
the expert has determined that the “critical value” is 2.94: any value of the
event date excess return greater in magnitude than this value will lead the
expert to determine that the excess return is statistically significant at the 5%
level. A lower value for the excess return would lead to a finding of statistical
insignificance.
When an event date excess return is statistically significant at the chosen
significance level, courts will treat the size of the excess return as a measure
of the price effect associated with the news at issue. 129 One consequence is
that the excess return may then be used as a basis for determining damages.
On the other hand, if the excess return is statistically insignificant at the
chosen level, then courts find the statistical evidence too weak to meet the
plaintiff’s burden of persuasion that the information affected the stock price.
Note that a statistically insignificant finding may occur even when the
excess return is directionally consistent with the plaintiff’s allegations. In
such a case, the evidence is consistent with the plaintiff’s theory of the case,
but the size of the effect is too small to be statistically significant at the level
used by the court. Such an outcome may sometimes occur even when the null
hypothesis was really false, i.e., there really was a price impact due to the
news on the event date.
This last point hints at an inherent trade-off reflected in statistical
significance testing. When one conducts a statistical significance test, there
are four possible outcomes. These four categories of statistical inference are
summarized in Table 1. Two of these are correct inferences: the test may fail
to reject a null hypothesis that is really true, or the test may reject a null
hypothesis that is really false. The first of these cases correctly determines

127. The standard deviation is a measure of how spread out a large random sample of the
variable is likely to be. The standard deviation of a firm’s excess returns is often estimated using
the root-mean-squared error, a statistic that is usually reported by statistical software. See, e.g.,
HUMBERTO BARRETO & FRANK M. HOWLAND, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: USING MONTE
CARLO S IMULATION WITH MICROSOFT EXCEL 117 (2006) (describing the calculation and use of
root-mean-squared error).
128. This figure arises because 1.96 times 1.5 is 2.94. As we discuss in Part IV, infra, there are
a number of potential problems with this typical approach.
129. See Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 600–01 (explaining that many courts applying the
event study approach look to the size of the excess return in relation to a predetermined statistical
significance level to determine whether the price impact is actionable).
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that there was no price impact (the upper left box in Table 1). The second
case correctly determines that there was a price impact (the lower right box
in Table 1). Given that there really was a price impact, the probability of
correctly making this determination is known as the test’s power.130
The other two outcomes are incorrect inferences. The first mistaken
inference involves rejecting a null hypothesis that is actually true. This is
known as a Type I error (top right box in Table 1). The probability of this
result, given that the null hypothesis is true, is known as a test’s size.131 The
second incorrect inference is failing to reject a null hypothesis that is actually
false (lower left box in Table 1); this is known as a Type II error. 132

Table 1: Four Categories of Statistical Inference

Null is true
No highly unusual
price effect
Null is false
Highly unusual
price effect

Don’t Reject Null
Test does not find
statistically
significant
price effect

Reject Null
Test finds
statistically
significant
price effect

Accurate finding
of no price effect

Type I error
(Size)

Type II error

Accurate finding
of price effect
(Power)

The trade-off that arises in statistical significance testing is simple:
reducing a test’s Type I error rate means increasing its Type II error rate, and

130. Thus power is the probability of winding up in the lower right box in Table 1, given that
we must wind up in one of the two lower boxes; it is the ability of the test to identify a price impact
when it actually exists.
131. For this reason, a test with significance level of 5% is sometimes said to have size 0.05.
132. Given that the null hypothesis is false so that we must wind up in one of the two lower
boxes in Table 1, the probability of a Type II error equals one minus the test’s power. See Brav &
Heaton, supra note 11, at 593 & n.26 (“Statistical power describes the probability that a test will
correctly identify a genuine effect.” (quoting P AUL D. ELLIS, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO EFFECT
SIZES: S TATISTICAL POWER, META-ANALYSIS, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS
52 (2010))).

FISCH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

578

2/6/2018 11:05 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:553

vice versa.133 As noted above, event study authors usually use a confidence
level of 95%, which is the same as a Type I error rate of 5%.134 The Type II
error rate associated with this Type I error rate will depend on the typical
range of variability of excess returns, but it has recently been pointed out that
insisting on a Type I error rate of 5% when using event studies in securities
fraud litigation can be expected to cause very high Type II error rates. 135
Another way to put this is that event studies used in securities litigation are
likely to have very low power—very low probability of rejecting an actually
false null hypothesis—when we insist on keeping the Type I error rate as low
as 5%.136 We discuss this very important issue further in subpart V(C).
A final issue related to statistical significance concerns who bears the
burden of persuasion if the defendant seeks to use event study evidence to
show that there was no price impact related to an alleged misrepresentation.
Halliburton II states that “defendants must be afforded an opportunity before
class certification to defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged
misrepresentation did not actually affect the market price of the stock.”137 But
the case does not announce what statistical standard will apply to defendants’
evidence. As Merritt Fox discusses, one view is that the defendant must
present statistically significant evidence that the price changed in the
direction opposite to the plaintiff’s allegations.138 Alternatively, the
defendant might have to present evidence that is sufficient only to persuade
the court that its own evidence of the absence of price impact is more
persuasive than the plaintiff’s affirmative evidence of price impact. 139
As Fox has noted in other work, the applicable legal standard will have
considerable impact on the volume of cases that are able to survive beyond a
preliminary stage.140 Further, Fox points out, a variety of factors affect the
choice of approach, including social policy considerations about the
appropriate volume of securities fraud litigation. 141 The question of Rule

133. To be sure, it is sometimes true that two tests have the same Type I error rate but different
Type II error rates (or vice versa). However, the Type II error rate for a given test—such as the
significance testing approach typically used in event studies—can be reduced only by increasing
the Type I error rate (and vice versa).
134. See, e.g., In re Intuitive Surgical Sec. Litig., No. 5:13-cv-01920-EJD, 2016 WL 7425926,
at *15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016).
135. See Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 593–97 (demonstrating that, as a result, the standard
event study will frequently fail to reject the null hypothesis when the actual price impact is small).
136. For an excellent in-depth discussion, see id.
137. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).
138. See Fox, supra note 92, at 447–49.
139. Id. at 454–55. As Fox discusses, Federal Rule of Evidence 301 provides some support for
this second approach. Id. at 457. However, Fox also points out a number of complicating issues as
to the applicability of Rule 301 to 10b-5 actions. Id. at 457–58.
140. Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: What It’s All About, 1 J. FIN. REG. 135, 139–41 (2015).
141. Id. at 141.
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301’s applicability was appealed to the Fifth Circuit by the Halliburton
parties, but the parties reached a proposed settlement before that court could
issue its ruling.142 A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of the
present Article. For concreteness, we will simply follow the approach taken
by the district court in the ongoing Halliburton litigation. While that court
found “that both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion are
properly placed on Halliburton,”143 the court did not understand that burden
allocation to require Halliburton to affirmatively disprove the plaintiff’s
allegations statistically. Rather, Halliburton needed only to “persuade the
Court that its expert’s event studies [were] more probative of price impact
than the Fund’s expert’s event studies.” 144 The rest of the court’s opinion
makes clear that this means treating both sides’ event studies as if they are
testing whether the statistical evidence is sufficient to establish that there is
statistically significant evidence of a price impact at the 5% level, as
discussed above. We will therefore continue to concentrate on that approach
throughout this Article.
The foregoing discussion summarizes the basic methodology of event
studies as they are commonly used in securities litigation. In the next Part,
we present our own stylized event study of dates involved in the ongoing
Halliburton litigation both to illustrate the principles described above and to
facilitate our Part IV discussion of important refinements that experts and
courts should make to achieve consistency with announced standards. We
raise the question of whether those standards are appropriate in Part V.
III. The Event Study as Applied to the Halliburton Litigation
This Part uses data and methods from the opinions and expert reports in
the Halliburton case to illustrate and critically analyze the use of an event
study to measure price impact. Our objective is, initially, to provide a basic
application of the theory described in the preceding Part for those readers
having limited familiarity with the operational details. Then, in Part IV, we
identify several problems with the typical execution of the basic approach
and demonstrate the implications of making the necessary adjustments to
respond to these problems.

142. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants Halliburton Co. & David J. Lesar at 52–60, Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 15-11096 (5th Cir. filed Feb. 8, 2016) (arguing that FED. R. EVID.
301 applies and “dictate[s] that plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion on price impact”); Brief of
the Lead Plaintiff-Appellee & the Certified Class at 49–58, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., No. 15-11096 (5th Cir. filed Mar. 28, 2016) (contending that Rule 301 does not apply to relieve
Halliburton of its burden of production and persuasion); as to settlement, see Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-01152-M, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2017).
143. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 260 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
144. Id.
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A.

Dates and Events at Issue in the Halliburton Litigation
Plaintiffs in the Halliburton litigation alleged that between the middle
of 1999 and the latter part of 2001,145 Halliburton and several of the
company’s officers—collectively referred to here as simply “Halliburton”—
made false and misleading statements about various aspects of the company’s
business.146 The operative complaint, together with the report filed by
plaintiffs’ experts, named a total of thirty-five dates on which either
misrepresenting statements or corrective disclosures (or both) allegedly
occurred.147 For purposes of illustration, consider two of the allegedly
fraudulent statements:
(1) Plaintiffs alleged that in a 1998 10-K report filed on March 23, 1999,
Halliburton failed to disclose that it faced the risk of having to
“shoulder the responsibility” for certain asbestos claims filed against
other companies; further, plaintiffs alleged that Halliburton failed to
correctly account for this risk. 148
(2) On November 8, 2001, Halliburton stated in its Form 10-Q filing for
the third quarter of 2001 that the company had an accrued liability of
$125 million related to asbestos claims and that “[W]e believe that
open asbestos claims will be resolved without a material adverse
effect on our financial position or the results of operations.” 149
Plaintiffs also alleged that this representation was false and
misleading.150
Both the alleged misrepresentations described above were confirmatory
in the sense that the plaintiffs alleged that Halliburton, rather than accurately
informing the market of negative news, falsely confirmed prior good news
that was no longer accurate. 151 The alleged result was that Halliburton’s stock
price was inflated because it remained at a higher level than it would have

145. We focus on the class period at issue at the time of the most recent district court order,
which ran from July 22, 1999, to December 7, 2001. The class period referred to in the operative
complaint began slightly earlier, on June 3, 1999. Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for
Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 para. 1, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. filed Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter
FCAC]. The difference is immaterial for our purposes.
146. Id. ¶ 2.
147. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 264. A defense expert report lists twenty-five distinct dates
on which plaintiffs or their expert alleged misrepresentations. Expert Report of Lucy P. Allen ¶ 10,
Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D.
Tex. filed Sept. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Allen Report].
148. FCAC, supra note 145, ¶ 74.
149. Id. ¶ 189.
150. Id. ¶ 190.
151. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV1152-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89598, at *17–18 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (discussing the “[p]laintiffs[’]
claim that Halliburton made material misrepresentations . . . to inflate the price of [its] stock”).
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had Halliburton disclosed accurately. Since false confirmatory
misrepresentations do not constitute “new” information—even under the
plaintiffs’ theory—neither of the two statements above would have been
expected to cause an increase in Halliburton’s market price. As a result, in
considering the price impact of the alleged misrepresentations, the district
court allowed the plaintiffs to focus on whether subsequent alleged corrective
disclosures were associated with reductions in Halliburton’s stock price.152
On July 25, 2015, the district court issued its most recent order and
memorandum opinion concerning class certification. 153 By this point of the
litigation, which had been ongoing for more than thirteen years, the event
studies submitted by the parties’ experts154 focused on six dates on which
Halliburton had issued alleged corrective disclosures: December 21, 2000; 155

152. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 262 (“Measuring price change at the time of the corrective
disclosure, rather than at the time of the corresponding misrepresentation, allows for the fact that
many alleged misrepresentations conceal a truth.”). As discussed in Part I, this is not a novel
approach. For example, one court of appeals has explained:
[P]ublic statements falsely stating information which is important to the value of a
company’s stock traded on an efficient market may affect the price of the stock even
though the stock’s market price does not soon thereafter change. For example, if the
market believes the company will earn $1.00 per share and this belief is reflected in
the share price, then the share price may well not change when the company reports
that it has indeed earned $1.00 a share even though the report is false in that the
company has actually lost money (presumably when that loss is disclosed the share
price will fall).
Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 419 (5th Cir. 2001). In contrast, by its very nature a
corrective disclosure cannot be confirmatory: for the alleged corrective disclosure to be truly
corrective, it must really be new news. Thus, evidence concerning the stock price change on the
date of an alleged corrective disclosure will always be probative. For simplicity, we will generally
focus on the case in which alleged misrepresentations were confirmatory, leading us to analyze the
corrective disclosure date. But see section IV(C)(3), infra, which considers the situation when
plaintiffs must establish price impact on both an alleged misrepresentation date and an alleged
corrective disclosure date.
153. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 280.
154. Expert Report of Chad Coffman, CFA, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc.
v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89598 (N.D. Tex. 2008)
[hereinafter Coffman Report] (plaintiffs’ expert); Allen Report, supra note 147 (defendants’ expert).
155. On this date, “Halliburton announced a $120 million charge which included $95 million
in project costs, some of which allegedly should not have been previously booked.” Coffman
Report, supra note 154, ¶ 8 (citing FCAC, supra note 145, ¶ 150).
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June 28, 2001;156 August 9, 2001;157 October 30, 2001;158 December 4,
2001;159 and December 7, 2001. 160
The trial court concluded in its July 2015 decision, after weighing two
competing expert reports, that five of these alleged corrective disclosures did
not have a price impact that was statistically significant at the 5% level. For
that reason, the district court denied class certification with respect to these
five dates.161 However, the district court found that the alleged corrective
disclosure on December 7 was associated with a statistically significant price
impact at the 5% level, in the direction necessary for plaintiffs to benefit from
the Basic presumption. The court therefore certified a class action with
respect to the alleged misrepresentations associated with December 7,
2001.162
B.

An Illustrative Event Study of the Six Dates at Issue in the Halliburton
Litigation
Following the approach outlined in Part II, we apply the event study to
the six dates listed in subpart III(A). For our first step (selection of an
appropriate event), we follow the parties and analyze the dates of the alleged
corrective disclosures. 163

156. On this date, “Halliburton disclosed that” third-party “Harbison-Walker asked for asbestos
claims related financial assistance from Halliburton.” Id. (citing FCAC, supra note 145, ¶ 170).
157. On this date, Halliburton’s “2Q01 10-Q included additional details regarding asbestos
claims.” Id. (citing FCAC, supra note 145, ¶ 178).
158. On this date, “Halliburton issued a press release announcing the Mississippi verdict.” Id.
(citing Form 8-K, HALLIBURTON (Nov. 6, 2001), http://ir.halliburton.com/phoenix.zhtml?c
=67605&p=irol-sec&seccat01enhanced.1_rs=11&seccat01enhanced.1_rc=10
[https://perma.cc/A9U4-8QSK]).
159. On this date, “Halliburton announced Texas judgment and three other judgments.” Id.
(citing FCAC, supra note 145, ¶ 191).
160. On this date, “Halliburton announced Maryland verdict.” Id. (citing FCAC, supra note
145, ¶ 191).
161. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 279–80 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
162. Id. at 280. Halliburton subsequently requested and received permission to pursue an
interlocutory appeal of the class certification order pursuant to Rule 23(f). Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
v. Halliburton Co., No. 15–90038, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19519, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2015). The
issues on appeal did not concern the statistical aspects of event study evidence but rather were
related to the district court’s determination that Halliburton could not, at the class certification stage,
provide nonstatistical evidence challenging the status of news as a corrective disclosure. See id. at
*1–2 (Dennis, J. concurring) (“The petition raises the question of whether a defendant in a federal
securities fraud class action may rebut the presumption of reliance at the class certification stage by
producing evidence that a disclosure preceding a stock-price decline did not correct any alleged
misrepresentation.”). A settlement is pending in the case. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., No. 3:02-CV-01152-M, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2017).
163. We do not independently address the legal question as to whether the disclosures made on
the designated event dates are appropriately classified as corrective disclosures, as the trial court
determined that whether a disclosure was correctly classified as corrective was not properly before
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Next, we use the market model to construct Halliburton’s estimated
return.164 To account for factors outside the litigation likely associated with
Halliburton’s stock performance, we followed the parties’ experts and
estimated a market model with multiple reference indexes. The first such
index, introduced by the defendants’ expert, is intended to track the
performance of the S&P 500 Energy Index during the class period. 165 The
plaintiffs’ expert pointed out that this index is dominated by “petroleum
refining companies, not energy services companies like Halliburton.”166 In
his own market model, he therefore added a second index intended to reflect
the performance of Halliburton’s industry peers.167 We also included such an
index.168 Third, we included an index constructed to mimic the one the
defendants’ expert constructed to reflect the engineering and construction
aspects of Halliburton’s business.169 Because we found that the return on the
S&P 500 overall index added no meaningful explanatory power to the model,
we did not include it.
The resulting market model estimates170 are set forth in Table 2.171 These
estimates indicate that Halliburton’s daily stock return moves nearly one-forone with the industry peer index constructed from analyst reports—a one
percentage point increase in the industry peer index return is associated with
roughly a 0.9-point increase in Halliburton’s return. This makes the industry
peer index a good tool for estimating Halliburton’s expected return in the
the court at the class certification stage. See Halliburton, 309 F.R.D. at 261–62 (“[T]he issue of
whether disclosures are corrective is not a proper inquiry at the certification stage.”).
164. Since the possibility of unusual stock return behavior is the object of an event study in the
case, these dates should be removed from the set used in estimating the market model, and we do
exclude them. This issue was controverted between the parties, with the plaintiffs’ expert, Coffman,
excluding all thirty-five of the dates identified in either the complaint or in an earlier expert’s report.
The district court accepted the argument that dates not identified as alleged corrective disclosure
dates should be included in the event study, as defendants’ expert had argued. Id. at 265.
165. The defendants’ expert used this index in the market model, which she described in several
reports. Allen Report, supra note 147, ¶ 20. We obtained a list of companies represented in this
index during the class period from Exhibit 1 of the report of the plaintiffs’ expert. Coffman Report,
supra note 154, at Exhibit 1. We then calculated the return on a value-weighted index based on
these firms by calculating the daily percentage change in total market capitalization of these firms.
166. Coffman Report, supra note 154, ¶ 28.
167. This index is composed “of the companies cited by analysts as Halliburton’s peers at least
three times during the Class Period and with a market cap of at least $1 billion at the end of the
Class Period.” Id. ¶ 33.
168. We calculated the return on this index in the same way as the return on the energy index
described in note 165, supra; we took the list of included companies from Exhibit 3b of the Coffman
Report. Id. at Exhibit 3b.
169. We took the list of companies for this index from the Allen Report, supra note 147, ¶ 20
n.20.
170. These estimates are calculated using the ordinary least squares estimator.
171. We used simple daily returns to estimate this model. We found nearly identical results
when we entered all return variables in this model in terms of the natural logarithm of one plus the
daily return, as experts sometimes do. For simplicity we decided to stick with the raw daily return.
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absence of fraud. The energy index return is much less correlated with
Halliburton’s stock return, with a coefficient of only about 0.2. Both the
energy and industry peer index coefficients are highly statistically significant,
with each being many multiples of its estimated standard error. By contrast,
the return on the energy and construction index has essentially no association
with Halliburton’s stock return and is statistically insignificant.
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Table 2: Market Model Regression Estimates
Variable
Industry Peer Index
Energy Index
E&C Index
Intercept
Root mean squared error
Number of dates

Coefficient
Estimate
0.903
0.210
0.033
-0.001

Estimated Standard
Error
0.031
0.048
0.036
0.001

1.745%
593

We then use these market model coefficient estimates to calculate daily
estimated excess returns for the six event dates excluded from estimation of
the model. We calculated the contribution of each index to each date’s
expected return by multiplying the index’s Table 2 coefficient estimate by
the observed value of the index on the date in question. Then we summed up
the three index-specific products just created and added the intercept (which
is so low as to be effectively zero). The result is the event date expected return
based on the market model, i.e., the variable plotted on the horizontal axis of
Figure 1 and Figure 3. The excess return for each event date is then found by
subtracting each date’s estimated expected return from its actual return.
Table 3 reports the actual, estimated expected, and estimated excess returns
for each of the six alleged corrective disclosure dates in the Halliburton
litigation, sorted from most negative to least negative. The actual returns are
all negative, indicating that Halliburton’s stock price dropped on each of the
alleged corrective disclosure dates. On three of the dates, the estimated
expected return was also negative, indicating that typical market factors
would be expected to cause Halliburton’s stock price to fall, even in the
absence of any unusual event. For the other three dates, market developments
would have been expected to cause an increase in Halliburton’s stock price.
This means the estimated excess returns on those dates will imply larger price
drops than are reflected in the actual returns. Finally, the estimated excess
return column in Table 3 shows that the estimated excess returns were
negative on all six dates. Even on dates when Halliburton’s stock price would
have been expected to fall based on market developments, it fell more than it
would have been expected to.
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Table 3: Actual, Expected, and Excess Returns for Event Dates

Event Date
December 7, 2001

Actual
Return
-42.4%

Estimated
Expected Return
0.3%

Estimated
Excess Return
-42.7%

August 9, 2001

-4.5%

0.6%

-5.1%

December 4, 2001

-0.7%

2.9%

-3.6%

December 21, 2000

-2.0%

-0.8%

-1.2%

October 30, 2001
June 28, 2001

-5.2%
-3.8%

-4.3%
-3.1%

-0.9%
-0.8%

The next step is to test these estimated excess returns for statistical
significance in order to determine whether they are unusual enough to meet
the court’s standard for statistical significance.
For the moment, we adopt the standard assumption that Halliburton
stock’s excess returns follow a normal distribution. Our Table 2 above reports
that the root-mean-squared error for our Halliburton market model—which
is an estimate of the standard deviation of excess returns—was 1.745%.
Multiplying 1.96 and 1.745, we obtain a critical value of 3.42%. 172 In other
words, in the absence of unusual events affecting Halliburton’s stock price
and assuming normality, we can expect that 95% of Halliburton’s excess
returns will take on values between ‒3.42% and 3.42%. For an alleged
corrective disclosure date, excess returns must be negative to support the
plaintiff’s theory, so a typical expert would determine that an event-date
excess return drop of 3.42% or more is statistically significant.
In the first column of Table 4, we again present the estimated excess
returns from Table 3. The second column reports whether the estimated
excess return is statistically significant at the 5% level based on the standard
approach to testing described above. The event date estimated excess returns
are statistically significant at the 5% level for December 7, 2001; August 9,
2001; and December 4, 2001; they are statistically insignificant at the 5%
level for the other three dates.

172. This follows because 1.96 times 1.745 equals 3.4202.
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Table 4: Standard Significance Testing for Event Dates
(sorted by magnitude of estimated excess return)

Event Date
December 7, 2001
August 9, 2001
December 4, 2001
December 21, 2000
October 30, 2001
June 28, 2001

Estimated
Excess Return
-42.7%
-5.1%
-3.6%
-1.2%
-0.9%
-0.8%

Critical
Value
-3.42%
-3.42%
-3.42%
-3.42%
-3.42%
-3.42%

Statistically
Significant
at 5 Percent Level
Using
Standard
Approach?
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

We can illustrate the standard approach by again using a graph that
relates actual and expected returns. As in earlier figures, Figure 2 again plots
the actual return on the vertical axis and the expected return on the horizontal
axis (with the set of points where these variables are equal indicated using an
upwardly sloped straight line). This figure also includes dots indicating the
expected and actual return for each day in the estimation period—these are
the dots that cluster around the upwardly sloped line.
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Figure 2: Scatter Plot of Actual and Expected Returns for
Alleged Corrective Disclosure Dates
and for Observations in Estimation Period

In addition, the figure includes three larger circles and three larger
squares. The circles indicate the alleged corrective disclosure dates for
December 31, 2000; October 30, 2001; and June 28, 2001—the alleged
corrective disclosure dates on which Table 4 tells us estimated excess returns
were negative (below the upwardly sloped line) but not statistically
significant according to the standard approach. The squares indicate the
alleged corrective disclosure dates for which estimated excess returns were
both negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. These are the three
dates in the top three rows of Table 4—December 7, 2001; August 9, 2001;
and December 4, 2001. We can tell that the price drops on these dates were
statistically significant at the 5% level because they appear in the shaded
region of the graph; as discussed in relation to Figure 3, infra, points in this
region have statistically significant price drops at the 5% level according to
the standard approach. In sum, our implementation of a standard event study
shows price impact for three dates, and it fails to show such impact at the 5%
level for the other three.
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IV. Special Features of Securities Fraud Litigation and Their Implications
for the Use of Event Studies
The validity of the standard approach to testing for statistical
significance, at whatever significance level is chosen, relies importantly on
four assumptions:
(1) Halliburton’s excess returns actually follow a normal
distribution—that assumption is the source of the 1.96
multiplier for the standard deviation of Halliburton’s estimated
excess returns in estimating the critical value.
(2) It is appropriate to use a multiplier that is derived by considering
what would constitute an unusual excess return in either the
positive or negative direction—i.e., an unusually large
unexpected movement of the stock in either the direction of
increase or the direction of decrease.
(3) It is appropriate to analyze each event date test in isolation
without taking into account the fact that multiple tests (six in
our Halliburton example) are being conducted.
(4) Under the null hypothesis, Halliburton’s excess returns have the
same distribution on each date; under the first assumption
(normality), this is equivalent to assuming that the standard
deviation of Halliburton’s excess returns is the same on every
date.
As it happens, each of these assumptions is false in the context of the
Halliburton litigation. The court did take appropriate account of the falsity
of the third assumption (involving multiple comparisons),173 but it failed even
to address the other three.
Violations of any of these assumptions will render the standard approach
to testing for statistical significance unreliable. That is true even if these
violations do not always cause the standard approach to yield incorrect
conclusions—i.e., conclusions that differ from what reliable methods would
yield—concerning statistical significance at the chosen significance level.
Just as a stopped clock is right twice a day, an unreliable statistical method
will yield the right answer sometimes.174 But the law demands more—it
demands a method that yields the right answer as often as asserted by those
using the method.

173. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 265–67 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
174. For example, a policy of never rejecting the null hypothesis would make no Type I errors,
and a policy of always rejecting the null hypothesis would make no Type II errors. Yet both policies
are obviously indefensible.
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In the remaining sections of this Part, we explain these four assumptions
in more detail, and we show that they are unsustainable in the context of the
Halliburton event study conducted in Part III.
A.

The Inappropriateness of Two-Sided Tests

In a purely academic study, economic theory may not predict whether
an event date excess return can be expected to be positive or negative. For
example, an announced merger might be either good or bad for a firm’s
market valuation. In such cases, statistical significance is appropriately tested
by checking whether the estimated excess return is large in magnitude
regardless of its sign. In other words, either a very large drop or a very large
increase in the firm’s stock price constitutes evidence against the null
hypothesis that the news had no impact on stock price. Such tests are known
as “two-sided” tests of statistical significance since a large value of the excess
return on either side of zero provides evidence against the null hypothesis. 175
In event studies used in securities fraud litigation, by contrast, price
must move in a specific direction to support the plaintiff’s case. For example,
an unexpected corrective disclosure should cause the stock price to fall. Thus,
tests of statistical significance based on event study results should be
conducted in a “one-sided” way so that an estimated excess return is
considered statistically significant only if it moves in the direction consistent
with the allegations of the party using the study. The one-sided–two-sided
distinction is one that courts and expert witnesses regularly miss, and it is an
important one.
Figure 3 illustrates this point. As in Figure 1, the upwardly sloped line
indicates the set of points where the actual and excess returns are equal. The
shaded area in Figure 3 depicts the set of points where the actual return is far
enough below the expected return—i.e., where the excess return is
sufficiently negative—so that the excess return indicates a statistically
significant price drop on the date in question.

175. See MacKinlay, supra note 114, at 28 (providing an example of a two-sided test and
explaining that the null hypothesis would be rejected if the abnormal return was above or below
certain thresholds).
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Figure 3: Illustrating Statistical Significance of Excess Returns

Consider the points indicated by a circle and a square in Figure 3, which
are equally far from the actual-equals-expected line but in opposite
directions. The circle depicts a point that has a positive excess return. Even
though the circle is sufficiently far away from the line, the point has the
wrong sign for an alleged corrective disclosure date, and no court would
consider such evidence a basis on which to find for the plaintiff. The square,
in contrast, depicts an excess return that is both negative and sufficiently far
below the expected return such that we conclude there was a statistically
significant price drop at the chosen significance level—as would be
necessary for a plaintiff alleging a corrective disclosure. Finally, consider the
point indicated by a triangle. This point is in the direction consistent with the
plaintiff’s allegations—a negative excess return for an alleged corrective
disclosure—but at this point the actual and expected returns are too close for
the excess return to be statistically significant at the chosen level. For an
alleged corrective disclosure date, only the square would provide statistically
significant evidence.
If no litigant would present evidence of a statistically significant price
movement in the wrong direction, why does the two-sided approach matter?
The reason is that the practical effect of this approach is to reduce the Type I
error rate for the tests used in event studies from the stated level of 5% to half
that size, i.e., to 2.5%. To see why, consider Figure 4. Higher points in the
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figure correspond to larger and more positive estimated excess returns. The
shaded regions correspond to the sets of excess returns that are further from
zero than the critical value of 1.96 standard deviations used by experts who
deploy the two-sided approach. For each shaded region, the probability that
a randomly chosen excess return will wind up in that region is 2.5%. Thus
the probability an excess return will be in either region—and thus that the
null hypothesis would be rejected if event study experts followed usual twosided practice—is 5% in total, which is the desired Type I error rate.
Figure 4: The Standard Approach to Testing on an Alleged Corrective
Disclosure Date with a Type I Error Rate of 5%
(Measured in Standard Deviation Units)
Very
unusual
positive
value:
2.5%

1.96

0

Not very
unusual
value:
95%

-1.96
Very
unusual
negative
value:
2.5%

However, on an alleged corrective disclosure date, the plaintiff’s
allegation is that the price fell due to the revelation of earlier fraud. As noted,
a finding that the date had an unusually large and positive excess return on
that date would certainly not be credited to the plaintiff by the court. That is
why only estimated excess returns that are large and negative are treated as
statistically significant for proving price impact on an alleged corrective
disclosure date. In other words, only estimated excess returns that are in the
bottom shaded region in Figure 4 would meet the plaintiff’s burden. As we
have seen, this region contains 2.5% of the probability when there is no actual
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effect of the news in question. 176 This means that a finding of statistical
significance would occur only 2.5% of the time when the null hypothesis is
true—or half as frequently as the 5% rate that courts and experts say they are
attempting to apply. 177
Although a reduction in Type I errors is desirable with all else held
equal, as we discussed in subpart II(B), supra, there is a trade-off between
Type I and Type II error rates. As a result of this trade-off, the Type II error
rate of a test rises—possibly dramatically—as the Type I error rate is reduced.
This means that using a Type I error rate of 2.5% in an event study induces
many more false negatives than using a Type I error rate of 5%.178
This mistake is easily corrected. Rather than base the critical value on
the two-sided testing approach, one simply uses a one-sided critical value. In
terms of Figure 4, that means choosing the critical value so that a randomly
chosen excess return would turn up in the bottom shaded region 5% of the
time, given that the news of interest actually had no impact. Still maintaining
the assumption that excess returns are normally distributed, the relevant
critical value is –1.645 times the standard deviation of the stock’s excess
returns.179 In our application, this yields a critical value for an event date
excess return of –2.87%; any excess return more negative than this value will
yield a finding of statistical significance. 180 This is a considerably less
demanding critical value than the –3.42% based on the two-sided approach.
Consequently, switching to the one-sided test will correct an erroneous
finding of no statistical significance at the 5% level whenever the estimated
excess return is between –3.42% and –2.87%.
As it happens, none of the estimated excess returns in Table 4 has a
value in this range, so correcting this error does not affect any of the statistical

176. The fact that two-tailed tests are erroneous has been noted in recent literature. See Edward
G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and the Integration of Law and
Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 353 (2016) (acknowledging
that the usual two-tailed test delivers a Type I error rate of only 2.5%); Fox, supra note 92, at 445
n.22 (same). Those authors seem to accept that courts will continue to use a method that is twice as
demanding of plaintiffs as the method that courts say they require. We see no reason why courts
should allow such a state of affairs to continue, especially one that is so easy to remedy.
177. A method that delivers many more false negatives than claimed surely raises important
Daubert and FED. R. EVID. 702 concerns. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
594 (1993) (asserting that courts should consider known or potential rates of error of scientific
techniques).
178. We discuss power implications of this issue in Part V.
179. This is so because a normally distributed random variable will take on a value less than
–1.645 times its standard deviation 5% of the time. If one were testing for statistical significance on
the date of a nonconfirmatory alleged misrepresentation, one would use a critical value of 1.645
times the standard deviation of the excess return since a normally distributed random variable will
take on a value greater than 1.645 times its standard deviation 5% of the time.
180. This critical value is the product of –1.645 and the estimated standard deviation of 1.745%:
–1.645 × 1.745% = –2.87%.
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significance determinations we made in Part III for Halliburton. But that is
just happenstance; had any of the estimated excess returns fallen in this range,
our statistical significance conclusion would have changed. Further,
Halliburton’s median daily market value was $17.6 billion over the
estimation period, so the range of estimated excess returns that would have
led to a switch—i.e., ‒3.42% to –2.87%—corresponds to a range of
Halliburton market value of nearly $100 million. In other words, using the
erroneous approach would, in the case of Halliburton, require a market value
drop of almost $100 million more than should be required to characterize the
drop as highly unusual.
B.

Non-Normality in Excess Returns
Recall that, as discussed above, we characterize an excess return as
highly unusual by looking at the distribution of excess returns on days when
there is no news. The standard event study assumes that this distribution is
normal.181 There is no good reason, however, to assume that excess stock
returns are actually normally distributed, and there is considerable evidence
against that assumption. 182 Stocks’ excess returns often exhibit empirical
evidence of skewness, “fat tails,” or both; and neither of these features would
occur if excess returns were actually normal. 183
In the case of Halliburton, we found strong evidence that the excess
returns distribution was non-normal over the class period. Summary statistics
indicate that Halliburton’s excess returns exhibit negative skew: they are
more likely to have positive values than negative ones. Further, the
distribution has fat tails, with values far from the distribution’s center than
would be the case if excess returns were normally distributed. Formal
statistical tests reinforce this story: Halliburton’s estimated excess returns
systematically fail to follow a normal distribution over the estimation
period.184

181. See generally Gelbach, Helland & Klick, supra note 19 (discussing normal distribution).
182. For early evidence on non-normality, see Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using
Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4–5 (1985). For more recent
evidence in the single-firm, single-event context, see Gelbach, Helland & Klick, supra note 19, at
511, 534–37.
183. The existence of skewness indicates, roughly speaking, that the distribution of returns is
weighted more heavily to one side of the mean than the other; the existence of fat tails—formally
known as kurtosis—indicates that extreme values of the excess return are more likely in either
direction than they would be under a normal distribution. See Brown & Warner, supra note 182, at
4, 9–10 (discussing the issues of skewness and kurtosis in the context of event studies that use daily
stock-return data).
184. To test for normality, we used tests discussed by Ralph B. D’Agostino, Albert Belanger &
Ralph B. D’Agostino, Jr., Commentary, A Suggestion for Using Powerful and Informative Tests of
Normality, 44 AM. STATISTICIAN 316 (1990), and implemented by the statistical software Stata via
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We illustrate the role of the normality assumption in Figure 5, which
plots various probability density functions for excess returns. Roughly
speaking, a probability density function tells us the frequency with which a
given value of the excess return is observed. The probability of observing an
excess return value less than, say, x is the area between the horizontal axis
and the probability density function for all values less than x. The curve
plotted with a solid line in the top part of Figure 5 is the familiar density
function for a normal distribution (also known colloquially as a bell curve)
with standard deviation equal to one. To the left of the point where the excess
return is –1.645, the shaded area equals 0.05; this reflects the fact that a
normal random variable will take on a value less than –1.645 standard
deviations 5% of the time. To put it differently, the 5th percentile of standard
normal distribution is –1.645; that is why we use this figure for the critical
value to test for a price drop at a significance level of 5% when excess returns
are normally distributed.
The curve plotted with a dashed line in the top part of Figure 5 is the
probability density function for a different distribution. Compared to the
standard normal distribution, the left-tail percentiles of this second
distribution are compressed toward its center. That means fewer than 5% of
this distribution’s excess returns will take on a value less than –1.645; the 5th
percentile of this distribution is closer to zero, equal to roughly –1.36. Thus,
when the distribution of excess returns is compressed toward zero relative to
the normal distribution, we must use a more forgiving critical value—one
closer to zero—to test for a significant price drop.
The bottom graph in Figure 5 again plots the standard normal
distribution’s probability density function with a solid line. In contrast to the
top graph, the curve plotted with a dashed line now depicts a distribution of
excess returns for which left-tail percentiles are splayed out compared to the
normal distribution. The 5th percentile is now –2.35, so that we must use a
more demanding critical value—one further from zero—to test for
significance.
As this discussion illustrates, the assumption that excess returns are
normally distributed is not innocuous: if the assumption is wrong, an event
study analyst might use a very different critical value from the correct one.
It might seem a daunting task to determine the true distribution of the
excess return. However, Gelbach, Helland, and Klick (GHK) show that under
the null hypothesis that nothing unusual happened on the event date, the
estimated excess return for a single event date will have the same statistical

the “sktest” command. This test rejected normality with a confidence level of 99.98%, due primarily
to the distribution’s excess kurtosis.
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properties as the actual excess return for that date. 185 This result provides a
simple correction to the normality assumption: instead of using the features
of the normal distribution to determine the critical value for statistical
significance testing, we use the 5th percentile of the distribution of excess
returns estimated using our market model. 186 GHK describe this percentile
approach as the “SQ test” since the approach relies for its theoretical
justification on the branch of theoretical statistics that concerns the behavior
of sample quantiles, which, for our purposes, are simply observed
percentiles.187

185. Gelbach, Helland & Klick, supra note 19, at 538–39. GHK actually use somewhat
different notation; the estimated excess return described in the present Article is the same as GHK’s
𝛾̂ regression parameter. With this difference noted, our point about statistical properties is
demonstrated in GHK’s Appendix B. This result is practically useful provided that the number of
dates used to estimate the market model is large. We used data from July 22, 1999, through
December 7, 2001, excluding the event dates at issue; this set of dates corresponds to the plaintiffs’
proposed class period at issue at the time the district court last considered class certification. See
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Tex. 2015). This means that we
used 593 dates in the market model, which is surely large in the statistically relevant sense.
186. The SQ test will erroneously reject a true null hypothesis with probability that becomes
ever closer to 0.05 as the number of observations in the estimation period grows. This is an example
of an asymptotic result, according to which the probability limit of the erroneous rejection
probability precisely equals 0.05. Contemporary econometrics is dominated by a focus on such
asymptotic results. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 619 (7th ed. 2012)
(discussing the absence of an asymptotic result). Unpublished tabulations from the data GHK used
show that the SQ test performs extremely well even when using estimation period sample sizes
considerably lower than the 250 days used here. The underlying reason the SQ test works—the
reason that the standard approach’s normality assumption may be jettisoned—is that the critical
value necessary for testing the null hypothesis of no event-date effect is simply the 5th percentile of
the true excess returns distribution. Due to an advanced statistics result known as the Glivenko–
Cantelli theorem, the percentiles of this distribution—also known as quantiles—may be
appropriately estimated using the percentiles of the estimated excess returns distribution. For details,
see section 5.1 of Gelbach, Helland & Klick, supra note 19, at 517–20.
187. Gelbach, Helland & Klick, supra note 19, at 497.
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For a statistical significance test with a significance level of 5%, the SQ
test entails using a critical value equal to the 5th percentile of the estimated
excess returns distribution among non-event dates. Among the 593 non-event
dates in our class period estimation sample, the 5th percentile is –3.08%.188
According to GHK’s SQ test, then, this is the value we should use as the
critical value for testing whether event date excess returns are statistically
significant. Thus, when we drop the normality assumption and instead allow
the distribution of estimated excess returns to drive our choice of critical
values directly, we conclude that an alleged corrective disclosure date’s
estimated excess return is statistically significant if it is less than –3.08%.
Note that this critical value is greater than the value of –2.87% found in
subpart IV(A), supra, where we maintained the assumption of normality.
Thus, relaxing the normality assumption has the effect of making the standard
for a finding of statistical significance about 0.21 percentage points more
demanding.189 Although this correction does not affect our determination as
to any of the six event dates in our Halliburton event study, it is nonetheless
potentially quite important because 0.21 percentage points corresponds to a
range of Halliburton’s market value of nearly $40 million.
As we discuss in our online Appendix A, the SQ test has both statistical
and operational characteristics that make it very desirable. First, it involves
estimating the exact same market model as the standard approach does. It
requires only the trivial additional step of sorting the estimated excess return
values for the class period in order to find the critical value—something that
statistical software packages can do in one easy step in any case. The
operational demands of using the SQ test are thus minor, and we think experts
and courts should adopt it. And second, the SQ test not only is appropriate in
many instances where the normality assumption fails but also is always
appropriate when the normality assumption is valid. Thus there is no cost to
using the SQ test, by comparison to the standard approach of assuming
normality.
C.

Multiple Event Dates of Interest
The approaches to statistical significance testing discussed above were
all designed for situations involving the analysis of a single event date. As

188. We find the 5th percentile of a sample by multiplying the number of dates in the sample
by 0.05, which yields 29.65. Conventionally, this means that the 5th percentile lies between the 29th
and 30th most negative estimated excess returns; in our sample, these are –3.089066% and
–3.074954%. (The shares of estimated excess returns less than or equal to these values are 4.89%
and 5.06%. Their midpoint is –3.08201%, which is our estimate of the 5th percentile.)
189. That is, an estimated excess return must now be more negative than –3.08%, rather than
–2.87%, to be found statistically significant.
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we have seen, however, there are six alleged corrective disclosure dates at
issue in the Halliburton litigation. The distinction is important.
The more tests one does while using the same critical value, the more
likely it is that at least one test will yield a finding of statistical significance
at the stated significance level even when there truly was no price impact.
More event dates means more bites at the same apple, and the odds the apple
will be eaten up increase with the number of bites. At the same time, however,
securities litigation differs from the example in that multiple events do not
always relate to the same fraud. Corrective disclosures relating to different
misstatements are different pieces of fruit. We discuss the multiple
comparison adjustment first, in section 1, and then, in section 2, we explain
an approach for determining when such an adjustment is warranted. In
section 3, we address the very different statistical problem raised by a
situation in which a plaintiff must prove both the existence of price inflation
on the date of an alleged misrepresentation and the existence of a price drop
on the date of an alleged corrective disclosure. 190
1. When the question of interest is whether any disclosure had an
unusual effect.—In our event study analysis so far, we have tested for
statistical significance as if each of the six event dates’ estimated excess
returns constituted the only one being tested. As mentioned above, this means
the probability of finding at least one event date’s estimated excess return
significant will be considerably greater than the desired Type I error rate of
5%. The defendants raised the multiple comparison issue in the Halliburton
litigation, and it played a substantial role in the court’s analysis.191
Various statistical approaches exist to account for multiple testing. 192
One approach is called the Holm–Bonferroni p-value correction. The district
court used this approach in Halliburton.193 To understand this correction, it
is first necessary to explain the term p-value. The p-value can be viewed as
another way of describing statistical significance. In terms of our prior
analysis, if the estimated excess return for a single date is statistically
significant at the 5% level, then the p-value for that date must be less than or

190. Cases that present a combination of the questions addressed in sections 1 and 2 are more
complicated notationally and mathematically; we address such cases in our online Appendix A.
191. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 266 (N.D. Tex. 2015)
(finding that “a multiple comparison adjustment is proper in this case”).
192. Some of them solve the Type I error rate problem at the cost of substantially increasing
the Type II error probability—i.e., substantially reducing the power of the test to detect price impact
where it actually occurred. As multiple testing methodology involves some fairly technical
mathematical details, we will not discuss it in detail. For a brief but exceedingly clear discussion
see Hervé Abdi, Holm’s Sequential Bonferroni Procedure, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RESEARCH
DESIGN 573 (Neil J. Salkind ed., 2010).
193. Halliburton, 309 F.R.D. at 266–67.
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equal to 0.05. If, on the other hand, the estimated excess return is not
statistically significant, then the p-value must be above 0.05. We will refer to
p-values that are computed as if only a single date were being tested as
“usual” p-values; this allows us to distinguish between usual and multiplecomparison-adjusted p-values.
Calculating the usual p-value for an alleged corrective disclosure date
when using the one-sided SQ test involves counting up the number of
estimated excess returns from the market model estimation period that are
more negative than the estimated excess return on the event date and then
dividing by the number of dates included when estimating the market model
(593 in our Halliburton example). We report the usual p-value for each
alleged corrective disclosure date in the second column of Table 5; the third
column reports whether price impact was found statistically significant at the
5% level using the one-sided SQ test. Note that the usual p-value is less than
0.05 for all three dates with price impacts that are statistically significant at
the 5% level and greater than 0.05 for the other three.
Table 5: Controlling for Multiple Testing
Using the Holm–Šídák Approach
One-Sided SQ
Approach, Ignoring
Multiple Testing Issue
Statistically
Significant
at 5%
p-value
Level?

One-Sided SQ Approach,
With Šídák Correction for
Multiple Testing
Statistically
Significant
at 5%
p-value
Level?

Event Date

Excess
Return

December 7, 2001

-42.7%

0

Yes

0

Yes

August 9, 2001

-5.1%

0.0017

Yes

0.0034

Yes

December 4, 2001

-3.6%

0.0269

Yes

0.0787

NO

December 21, 2000

-1.2%

0.2222

No

0.6340

No

October 30, 2001

-0.9%

0.2609

No

0.7795

No

June 28, 2001

-0.8%

0.3013

No

0.8837

No

The fourth column of the Table reports p-values that are corrected for
multiple testing. 194 The final column reports whether the Holm–Šídák p-

194. There are different flavors of p-values that correct for multiple comparisons. The type we
have reported in the Table is known as Šídák. Abdi, supra note 192, at 575. To calculate the Šídák
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value is less than 0.05, in which case there is statistically significant price
impact even after adjusting for the presence of multiple tests. 195 Table 5
shows that after correcting for multiple testing, we find significant price
impacts at the 5% level for December 7, 2001, and August 9, 2001, but not
for the other four dates. Thus, relative to the one-sided SQ test that does not
correct for multiple tests, the effect of correcting for multiple tests is to
convert the finding of statistical significance at the 5% level for December 4,
2001, to a finding of insignificance.
2. How should events be grouped together to adjust for multiple
testing?—A critical threshold question before applying a multiple
comparison adjustment is to determine which, if any, of a plaintiff’s multiple
alleged corrective disclosure dates should be grouped together. In the
preceding section we grouped all dates together because that is the approach
the district court took in the Halliburton litigation.196 However, it is not clear
that this is the best—or even a good—approach. As noted, using multiple

p-value for the event date with the lowest usual p-value is just that usual p-value; thus the p-value
for the excess return on December 7, 2001, is unaffected by the correction for multiple comparisons.
Let the second lowest usual p-value be called 𝑝2 (December 4, 2001, in our event study). The
formula for the Šídák p-value for this date is 𝑝𝑆2 = 1 − (1 − 𝑝2 )2 . The logic of this formula is that
the probability of independently drawing two excess returns that are more negative than the usual
p-value actually observed on this date, i.e., 𝑝𝑆2 , is (1 − 𝑝2 )2 ; thus the probability of not drawing a
more negative excess return is 𝑝𝑆2 . The value 𝑝𝑆2 is thus the probability of taking two draws from
the excess returns distribution and observing at least one with a more negative excess return than
𝑝2 . It can be shown that when this probability is less than 0.05, the underlying statistic is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
For the event date with the third lowest usual p-value, which we will call 𝑝3 , the formula for the
Šídák p-value for this date is 𝑝𝑆3 = [1 − (1 − 𝑝3 )3 ]; again the logic is that this is the probability of
drawing repeatedly (now, three times) from the excess returns distribution and obtaining an excess
return that is more negative than the date in question. In general, let the usual p-value for the date
with the mth-lowest usual p-value be 𝑝𝑚 ; then the Šídák p-value for this date is 𝑝𝑆𝑚 = 1 −
(1 − 𝑝𝑚 )𝑚 . See id. at 576 (equation (8)). We note also that for small values of 𝑝𝑚 and small values
of the exponent m, Šídák p-values are well-approximated by 𝑚 × 𝑝𝑚 , which is known as the
Bonferroni p-value. Id. (equation (9)). In our application it turns out not to matter which of the two
approaches we use, though in general, the Šídák p-value is more accurate than the Bonferroni pvalue. Id. at 575–76. The district court in the Halliburton litigation addressed the choice between
Bonferroni and Šídák p-values because experts in the case debated which was more appropriate.
Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 265–67. In this case, the choice makes no difference to the actual
statistical significance determinations.
195. That is, we consider the price impact on the date with the second-lowest p-value to be
significant only if its Šídák p-value is less than 0.05. If date six’s price impact is not statistically
significant, then we consider all dates’ price impacts to be insignificant. If date five’s price impact
is significant, then we turn to considering date four’s price impact, considering it significant if date
four’s Šídák p-value is less than 0.05; if not, we stop, but if so, we turn to date three’s price impact,
and so on.
196. Halliburton, 309 F.R.D. at 265–66.
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event dates gives the plaintiff an advantage by increasing the chance of
achieving statistical significance with respect to each transaction.
How do we identify which disclosure dates to group together? A full
analysis of this mixed question of law and advanced statistical methodology
is beyond the scope of this Article, but one simple solution is to draw an
analogy to general principles of claim preclusion. Rule 18(a)’s generous
claim-joinder rule allows, but does not require, a plaintiff to bring all possible
claims in a single lawsuit. 197 Thus, a plaintiff might choose to bring separate
actions with only a subset of alleged corrective disclosure dates at issue in
each action. The rules of claim preclusion impose a limit on plaintiffs’ power
to litigate multiple claims independently, however, by looking to whether two
claims are sufficiently closely related. 198 If so, a judgment on one such claim
will preclude a separate cause of action on the second.
We suggest that if a losing judgment in Claim 1 would preclude a
plaintiff from prevailing on Claim 2, then it is reasonable for the district court
to consider all alleged corrective disclosure dates for the two claims together
for purposes of multiple comparisons. Contrariwise, if losing on Claim 1
would not preclude Claim 2, then, we suggest, the alleged corrective
disclosure dates related to the two claims should be treated separately. This
rule would ensure that in addressing multiple alleged corrective disclosure
dates, courts require a consistent quantum of statistical evidence to obtain
class certification across collections of dates concerning the same or related
misstatements—i.e., claims that plaintiffs would naturally be expected to
litigate together. Basing this test on the law of claim preclusion prevents
future plaintiffs from gaming the system by attempting to bring multiple
lawsuits in order to avoid the multiple comparison adjustment. At the same
time, our rule would not penalize a plaintiff for bringing two unrelated claims
in the same action—thereby respecting and reinforcing the baseline set by
Rule 18(a).
To illustrate with respect to Halliburton, five of the six alleged
corrective disclosures analyzed there involved allegations related to
Halliburton’s asbestos liabilities. 199 The sixth alleged corrective disclosure

197. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (“A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or
alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.”).
198. Whether the claims are closely enough related is likely to be governed by the “transaction”
test. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The Restatement is of
course not per se binding on federal courts, but the Supreme Court has endorsed the Restatement’s
approach. See, e.g., United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (“The
now-accepted test in preclusion law for determining whether two suits involve the same claim or
cause of action depends on factual overlap, barring ‘claims arising from the same transaction.’”
(quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 n.22 (1982), and citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1980))).
199. Coffman Report, supra note 154, ¶ 8.
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date (December 21, 2000) involved Halliburton’s statements regarding
merger-related and other issues. 200 Assuming that the asbestos-related fraud
allegations are sufficiently separate from the merger and other allegations
that judgment in one set of claims would not preclude the other, the district
court should have treated the December 21, 2000 date separately from the
other five alleged corrective disclosure dates. This means that there would be
no necessary correction for multiple comparisons for December 21, 2000;
statistical significance testing for that date would follow the usual practice.
For the other five dates, the relevant number of tests would be five, rather
than six as used by the district court.201
It can be shown that this change would not affect any of the statistical
significance conclusions in our Halliburton event study. However, the
change would have made a difference in other circumstances. For example,
had the usual p-value for December 21, 2000, been below 0.05, it would again
be considered statistically significant at the 5% level using our approach to
grouping alleged corrective disclosure dates.202 This example helps illustrate
the importance of a court’s approach to determining the number of relevant
dates for purposes of adjusting for multiple testing. 203
3. When the question of interest is whether both of two event dates had
an effect of known sign.—There is another side to the multiple comparison
adjustment. Consider the situation in which the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant made a misrepresentation involving nonconfirmatory information
on Date One and then issued a corrective disclosure on Date Two. At class

200. Allen Report, supra note 147, ¶ 11.
201. It is true that this rule would require the district court to engage in a claim preclusion
analysis that would otherwise be unnecessary. However, such analysis will usually not be all that
cumbersome, and it provides a principled basis for determining when a multiple comparisons
adjustment is appropriate. Further, the decision related to a claim preclusion question might have
issue-preclusive effect, clarifying the scope of feasible subsequent litigation. That said, preclusion
raises a number of serious issues in the class action setting. For a discussion, see Tobias B. Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005).
202. Recall from Table 5 (supra at 146) that the usual p-value for this date is 0.2222, whereas
the p-value after correcting for multiple testing in the way the district court endorsed was 0.6340.
Suppose the usual p-value had been 0.04. Then the district court-endorsed approach—treating
December 21, 2000, as part of the same group as the other five dates for multiple testing purposes—
would have yielded a Holm–Šídák p-value of 0.0784. Thus the district court’s approach would not
find statistical significance, whereas our preclusion-based approach would.
203. Still another issue that arises here involves the problem that would arise if a plaintiff’s
expert tested some dates but then excluded consideration of them from her expert report in order to
hold down the magnitude of the multiple testing correction. Halliburton suggested that the plaintiffs
had done just that. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 264 (N.D. Tex.
2015). Halliburton also argued that all dates on which news similar to the alleged corrective
disclosures was released should be considered for purposes of determining the magnitude of the
multiple testing correction. Id. The judge rejected the allegations of unscrupulous behavior as a
factual matter. Id.
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certification, the plaintiff need not establish loss causation, so only price
impact on Date One would be at issue. However, both dates are relevant for
merits purposes since the plaintiff will have to prove both that the alleged
misrepresentation caused the stock price to rise and that the alleged corrective
disclosure caused the price to drop.
When the plaintiff is required to show price impact for both Date One
and Date Two, the situation differs from the one considered above where it
was sufficient for the plaintiff to show price impact as to any of multiple
dates. This case is the polar opposite of that presented in the Halliburton
litigation and requires a different statistical adjustment. In the case in which
two events must both be shown to have statistical significance, the statistical
threshold for finding price impact must be adjusted to be less demanding than
if only a single date is being analyzed.
To see why, consider what would happen if we used a traditional onesided test for each date separately, separately demanding a 5% Type I error
rate for each. For each day considered in isolation, we have seen that the
probability of finding statistical significance when there was no actual price
impact is one in twenty. Because these significance tests are roughly
independent,204 the probability that both tests will reject when each null
hypothesis is true is only one in 400, i.e., one-quarter of 1%.205 To put it
differently, requiring each date separately to have a 5% Type I error rate for
a finding of statistical significance is equivalent to requiring a Type I error
rate of just 0.25% in determining whether the plaintiff has met its merits
burden as to the alleged misrepresentation in question. This is obviously a
much more demanding standard than the 5% Type I error rate that courts and
experts say they are using. 206
To make an appropriate adjustment, we can again work with the usual
p-values. For an overall p-value equal to 0.05—again, corresponding to the
standard that experts say they are applying—we should determine that price
impact is significant on both days if each date has a usual p-value of less than

204. There are two potential reasons to question independence of the estimated excess returns.
First, suppose Date One involves an alleged misrepresentation and Date Two an alleged corrective
disclosure. If the alleged fraud is a real one, then the magnitudes of the excess returns on Dates One
and Two will be correlated. However, this fact is irrelevant to Type I error rate considerations in
statistical significance testing. Such testing imposes the null hypothesis that there was actually no
material fraud, in which case there is no reason to think the excess returns will be correlated. Second,
though, the estimated excess returns will have a bit of dependence because they are calculated from
the same estimated market model for which estimated coefficients will be common to the two event
date excess returns. However, this dependence can be shown to vanish as the number of dates in the
estimation period grows, and with 593 dates we would expect very little to persist.
205. This is the case because 1/20 times itself is 1/400, which is one-fourth of 1/100—or,
equivalently, a quarter of a percent.
206. In terms of confidence level, the actual standard amounts to 99.75% confidence rather than
the claimed 95%.
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0.2236.207 Using the one-sided SQ approach, this means that the estimated
price impact is statistically significant at the 5% level for the two days treated
as a bundle if:
(1) the estimated price impact for the alleged corrective disclosure
date is more negative than estimated excess returns for fewer
than 22.4% of the dates in the estimation period; and
(2) the estimated price impact for the alleged misrepresentation
date is greater than estimated excess returns for fewer than
22.4% of the dates in the estimation period.
The resulting test has a 5% Type I error rate, i.e., a 5% chance of
erroneously making a finding of statistical significance as to both dates
considered together.
To illustrate using our Halliburton example, think of December 21,
2000, as Date Two, and imagine that the alleged corrective disclosure on that
date had been associated not with a confirmatory disclosure but a
nonconfirmatory alleged misrepresentation on Date One. In that case, the
plaintiff would have to prove both that the stock price rose an unusual amount
on Date One and that it fell by an unusual amount following the alleged
corrective disclosure on December 21, 2000. Recall that the usual p-value for
the December 21, 2000 estimated excess return was 0.2222.208 This value just
makes the 0.2236 cutoff. If the hypothetical Date One estimated excess return
had a usual p-value of 0.2236 or lower, then both arms of our test would be
met.
In such a case, a court using the 5% significance level should find that
the plaintiff carried its burden to show both a material change in price for the
alleged misrepresentation and loss causation as to the alleged corrective
disclosure on December 21, 2000. This conclusion follows even though we
would not find statistically significant evidence of price impact at the 5%
level if December 21, 2000, were the only date of interest. This example
illustrates the consequences of the appropriate loosening of the threshold for
finding statistical significance when a party must demonstrate that something
unusual happened on each of multiple dates.
We know of no case where our argument has even been made, but it is
grounded in the same statistical analysis applied by the court in Halliburton.
Concededly, a court could take the view that for any single piece of statistical
evidence to be credited, that single piece must meet the 5% Type I error
rate—even if that means that a party who must show two pieces of evidence

207. This is true because the probability of finding that two independent tests have a usual pvalue of 𝑞 is 𝑞2 . Setting this equal to 0.05 and solving for 𝑞 yields 𝑞 = 0.2236068. Thus, we should
declare the pair of price impact estimates jointly significant if each has a usual p-value less than
this level.
208. See supra Table 5.
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is actually held to the radically more demanding standard of a 0.25% Type I
error rate.209 We believe that such a view is indefensible on probability
grounds.
D.

Dynamic Evolution of the Excess Return’s Standard Deviation

For a traditional event study to be probative, the behavior of the stock
in question must be stable over the market model’s estimation period. For
example, it must be true that, aside from the alleged fraud-related events
under study, the association between Halliburton’s stock and the broader
market during the class period is similar to the relationship for the estimation
period. If, for example, Halliburton’s association with its industry peers or
other firms in the broader market differed substantially in the two periods,
then the market model would not be a reliable tool for predicting the
performance of Halliburton’s stock on event dates, even in the absence of any
actual misrepresentations or corrective disclosures.
A second requirement is that, aside from any effects of the alleged
misrepresentations or corrective disclosures, excess returns on event dates
must have the same probability distribution as they do during the estimation
period. As we discussed in subpart IV(A), supra, the standard approach to
estimating the critical value for use in statistical significance testing is based
on the assumption that, aside from the effects of any fraud or corrective
disclosure, all excess returns come from a normal distribution with the same
standard deviation. But imagine that the date of an alleged corrective
disclosure happens to occur during a time of unusually high volatility in the
firm’s stock price—say, due to a spike in market uncertainty about demand
in the firm’s principle industry. In that case, even typical excess returns will
be unusually dispersed—and thus unusually likely to fall far from zero.
Failing to account for this fact would lead an event study to find statistically
significant price impact on too many dates, regardless of the significance
level, simply due to the increase in volatility. 210
Consider an extreme example to illustrate. Suppose that the standard
deviation of a stock’s excess return is usually 1%, and for simplicity, assume
that the excess returns always have a normal distribution. An expert who
assumes the standard deviation is 1% on an alleged corrective disclosure date

209. We note that our point is especially important for those situations in which there are more
than just two dates in question. For example, if there were five dates, then the true Type I error rate
when a court requires the plaintiff to meet the 5% Type I error rate separately for each date would
be less than 0.00003% (which is approximately 1 in 3.2 million—or 1/20 raised to the fifth power).
210. See Allen Report, supra note 147, ¶¶ 229–31, 233, 236 (illustrating how market forces can
impact a company’s stock volatility); Fox, Fox & Gilson , supra note 176, at 357 (indicating that
volatility can cause increased rates of statistically significant errors); Andrew C. Baker, Note,
Single-Firm Event Studies, Securities Fraud, and Financial Crisis: Problems of Inference, 68 STAN.
L. REV. 1207, 1250–51 (2016) (same).
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therefore will determine that the excess return for that date is statistically
significant at the 5% level if it is less than ‒1.645%.211 But suppose that on
the date of the alleged corrective disclosure, market uncertainty causes the
firm’s standard deviation to be much greater than usual—e.g., 2%. Then the
actual Type I error rate for the expert’s test of statistical significance is about
21%—more than four times the chosen significance level. 212 What has
happened here is that the increase in the standard deviation on the alleged
corrective disclosure date means that the excess return is more likely to take
on values further from the average of zero. Consequently, the excess return
on this date is more likely than usual to correspond to a price drop of more
than 1.645%. The opposite result would occur if the standard deviation were
lower on the alleged corrective disclosure date. With a standard deviation of
only one-half on that date, the Type I error rate would fall to 0.05%, which
is one one-hundredth of the chosen significance level. 213 Ignoring the alleged
corrective disclosure date’s difference in standard deviation in this situation
would make false negatives (Type II errors) much more common than would
a test that uses a correct critical value for the alleged corrective disclosure
date excess return.
Changes in volatility are a potentially serious concern in at least some
cases. Fox, Fox, and Gilson show that the stock market has experienced
volatility spikes in connection with every major economic downturn from
1925 to 2010, including the 2008 financial crisis.214 As they point out, the
effect of a volatility spike is to raise the necessary threshold for
demonstrating materiality or price impact with an event study, thereby
increasing the Type II error rate of standard event study tests. 215
Event studies can be adjusted to deal with the problem of dynamic
changes in standard deviation. To do so, one must use a model that is capable
of estimating the standard deviation of the event date excess return both for
dates used in the estimation period—our “usual” dates from above—and for
those dates that are the object of the price impact inquiry. The details of doing
so are fairly involved, requiring both a substantial amount of mathematical

211. Recall that for a normally distributed random variable, which has mean zero and standard
deviation one, the probability of taking on a value less than –1.645 is 0.05, i.e., 5%.
212. It is a fact of probability theory that the probability that a normally distributed random
variable with standard deviation 𝜎 takes on a value less than –1.645 is the same as the probability
that a normally distributed random variable with standard deviation of one takes on a value less than
−1.645/𝜎. Setting σ equal to two, the resultant probability is 0.2054, or roughly 21%.
213. Setting σ equal to 0.5, the probability in question is the probability that a normally
distributed random variable with standard deviation of one takes on a value less than –3.29, which
is 0.0005, or roughly 0.05%.
214. Fox, Fox & Gilson , supra note 176, at 335–36.
215. See id. at 357 (stating that a volatility spike “can result in a several-fold increase in Type II
error—that is, securities fraud claims will fail when they should have succeeded”).
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notation and a discussion of some technical econometric issues. Accordingly,
we relegate these details to our online Appendix C, which appears at the end
of this Article, and provide only a brief conceptual summary here. We use a
statistical model that allows the standard deviation of excess returns to vary
on a day-to-day basis—whether due to the evolution of market- or industrylevel return volatility or to the evolution of Halliburton’s own return
volatility. To compute the p-value for each event date, we use the model’s
estimates to rescale the excess returns for non-event dates so that all these
dates have the same standard deviation as each event date in question. We
then use the rescaled excess returns to conduct one-sided SQ tests with
correction for multiple testing, as discussed in the sections above.
Using the approach detailed in our online appendix, we find that the
standard deviation in Halliburton’s excess returns does not remain stable but
rather evolves over our time period in at least three important ways. First,
Halliburton’s excess returns have greater standard deviation on days when
the industry peer index returns have greater standard deviation. Second,
Halliburton’s excess returns are more variable on days when a measure of
overall stock market volatility suggests this volatility is greater.216 Third, the
standard deviation in Halliburton’s excess returns tended to be greater on
days when it was greater the day before and when Halliburton’s actual excess
return was further from zero (whether positive or negative).
Using the model estimates described in our online Appendix A, we
tested for normality of the rescaled excess returns. 217 We found that the data
resoundingly reject the null hypothesis that the white noise term 𝑢𝑡 is

216. This market-level measure is known as the VIX and is published by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange. It uses data on options prices, together with certain assumptions about the
behavior of securities prices, to back out an estimate of the variance of stock returns for the day in
question. Its use as a variance forecasting tool has recently been advocated in Baker, supra note
210, at 1239, following such use of an event study in a securities fraud litigation. See Expert Report
of Mukesh Bajaj ¶¶ 85, 88, 89 & n.150, In re Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (Freddie Mac) Sec.
Litig., 281 F.R.D. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:09-MD-2072 (MGC)) (cited in Baker, supra note
210, at 1245 n.217). We discuss Baker’s approach, and its implicit assumption that standardized
excess returns are normally distributed, in our online Appendix A. Finally, we note that another
recent paper suggests that when the assumptions about the behavior of securities prices, referred to
above, are incorrect, the VIX index does not directly measure the variance of the market return. See
K. Victor Chow, Wanjun Jiang & Jingrui Li, Does VIX Truly Measure Return Volatility? 2–3
(Aug. 30,
2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2489345
[https://perma.cc/82WX-CPSW] (explaining that the VIX index reliably measures the variance of
the stock market only under certain assumptions and offering a generalized alternative for use in its
place). Because our mission here is illustrative only, however, there is no harm in using the VIX
index itself; we note in addition that the VIX index is much less important in explaining the variance
of Halliburton’s excess returns than is volatility in the industry peer index.
217. We used the same method as in subpart IV(B). See supra note 187.
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distributed normally. 218 Accordingly, it is unreliable to base a test for
statistical significance on the assumption that 𝑢𝑡 follows a normal
distribution.219 We therefore use the SQ test approach described in subpart
IV(B), supra. Table 6 reports p-values from our earlier and new results. The
first three columns involve what we have called “usual” p-values, which are
computed as if statistical significance were being tested one date at a time
(i.e., ignoring the multiple-testing issue). The first column of these three
reports the usual p-values from Table 5, which were computed from
statistical significance tests that impose the assumption that the standard
deviation of Halliburton’s excess returns is the same on all dates. The second
column reports usual p-values computed from our model that allows the
standard deviation to evolve over time. Our third column shows that when
we ignore the issue of multiple tests, our conclusions from statistical
significance testing are the same whether we account for dynamics in the
daily standard deviation or not. (Three of the dates are found significant at
the 5% level using both approaches, and the other three are not.)
The last three columns of Table 6 provide p-value and significance
testing results when we take into account the fact that there are six alleged
corrective disclosure dates. 220 For five of the six dates, the significance
conclusion is unaffected by allowing Halliburton’s excess return standard
deviation to vary over time. However, for December 4, 2001, the p-value
drops substantially once we account for the possibility of evolving standard
deviation: it falls from 0.0787, which is noticeably above the significance
threshold of 0.05, to 0.03, which is almost as far below the threshold.
Allowing for the evolution of standard deviation thus would have mattered
critically in Halliburton, given that the court did account for the multiple
dates on which alleged corrective disclosures must be assessed statistically.
Table 6: Controlling for Evolution in the Volatility of
Halliburton’s Excess Returns

Event Date

Usual p-Value
(No Accounting for Multiple Tests)
Assuming Allowing
Constant
Dynamic
Standard
Standard
Statistical
Deviation Deviation Significance

Holm-Šídák p-Value
(Accounting for Six Tests)
Assuming
Allowing
Constant
Dynamic
Standard
Standard
Statistical
Deviation
Deviation Significance

218. While there is a bit of negative skew in the standardized estimated excess return, the test
rejects normality primarily because of excess kurtosis—i.e., fat tails—in the standardized excess
return distribution.
219. Baker appears to have done exactly this in his simulation study. See Baker, supra note
210, at 1246 (referring to the use of t-statistics to determine rejection rates).
220. See supra notes 194–95 (discussing the Holm–Šídák approach).
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December 7,
2001

0

0

Both

0

0

Both

August 9,
2001

0.0017

0.002

Both

0.0034

.003

Both

December 4,
2001

0.0269

0.010

Both

0.0787

.030

Dynamic
Only

December 21,
2000

0.2222

0.256

Neither

0.6340

.694

Neither

October 30,
2001

0.2609

0.317

Neither

0.7795

.881

Neither

June 28,
2001

0.3013

0.298

Neither

0.8837

.851

Neither

What drives this important reversal for the December 4, 2001 alleged
corrective disclosure? For that date, our volatility model yields an estimated
standard deviation of 1.5%. This is lower than the value of 1.745% in the
constant-variance model underlying Table 5, and that is part of the story. But
there is more to it. When we assumed constant variance across dates, there
were sixteen estimation period dates that had a more negative estimated
excess return than the one for December 4, 2001. Once we allowed for the
standard deviation to evolve over time, all but one of these sixteen dates had
an estimated standard deviation greater than 1.5%. In some cases, the
difference was quite substantial, and this is what is driving the very large
change in the p-value for December 4, 2001. 221
In sum, the standard deviation on December 4, 2001, was a bit on the low
side, while dates in the left tail of the excess returns distribution had very
high standard deviations. When we multiply by the scale factor to make all
other dates comparable to December 4, 2001, the rescale excess returns for
left-tail dates move toward the middle of the distribution. This result indicates

221. For example, five of the sixteen dates had estimated values of 𝜎𝑡 in excess of 0.023. While
this might not seem like much of a difference, it is, because the standardized estimated excess return
𝑢𝑡 is the ratio of the estimated excess return 𝜀𝑡 to the estimate of 𝜎𝑡 . Dividing the December 4, 2001
estimated excess return by 0.015 while dividing these other five dates’ estimated excess returns by
0.023 is the same as increasing the December 4, 2001 estimated excess return by a factor of more
𝜀
than
50%.
To
see
this,
observe
that
since
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡 ,
we
have
𝜀4𝐷𝑒𝑐2001
𝜀𝑡

=

𝑢4𝐷𝑒𝑐2001
𝑢𝑡

0.023

× 0.015 = 1.53 ×

𝑢4𝐷𝑒𝑐2001
𝑢𝑡

𝑡

, so that this constellation of estimated values of 𝜎𝑡

makes a very large difference in the relative value of the December 4, 2001 alleged corrective
disclosure date’s standardized estimated excess return, by comparison to dates with very negative
nonstandardized estimated excess returns.
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that the December 4, 2001 excess return is considerably more unusual than it
appears when we fail to account for dynamic evolution in the standard
deviation. Once we correct that failure, we find that the excess return on the
alleged corrective disclosure date of December 4, 2001, is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
E. Summary and Comparison to the District Court’s Class Certification
Order
Our analysis in this Part raises four issues that are often not addressed in
event studies used in securities litigation: the inappropriateness of two-sided
testing, the non-normality of excess returns, multiple-inference issues that
arise when multiple dates are at issue, and dynamic volatility in excess
returns. After accounting for all four of these issues in our event study using
data from the Halliburton litigation, we find that at the 5% level there is
statistically significant evidence of negative excess returns on three dates:
December 7, 2001; August 9, 2001; and December 4, 2001. The district court
certified a class related to December 7, 2001, in line with one of our results.
However, it declined to certify a class with respect to the other dates.
As to August 9, 2001, the court did find that “there was a price movement
on that date,”222 which is in line with our statistical results. However, the
court found that Halliburton had proved (i) that the information the plaintiff
alleged constituted a corrective disclosure had been disclosed less than a
month earlier, and that (ii) there had been no statistically significant change
in Halliburton’s stock price on the earlier date. 223 Thus, the court found for
purposes of class certification that the alleged corrective disclosure on
August 9, 2001, did not warrant the Basic presumption.224 We express no
opinion as to this determination.
The court’s decision not to certify a class as to December 4, 2001, was
founded entirely on its statistical findings of fact. 225 The court came to this
finding by adopting the event study methodology used by Halliburton’s
expert.226 While that expert did correct for multiple inferences, she failed to
appropriately deal with the other three issues we have raised in this Part. A
court that adopted our methodology and findings while using the 5% level

222. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 272 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
223. Id. at 272–73.
224. Id. at 273.
225. Id. at 276 (“[T]he Court will look only at whether there was a statistically significant price
reaction on December 4, 2001.”).
226. Id. (“If [Halliburton’s expert’s methodology is] applied to [the plaintiff’s expert’s] model,
there was no statistically significant price reaction on December 4.”). The court noted that it “ha[d]
already explained that these adjustments [were] appropriate.” Id. It therefore found “a lack of price
impact on December 4, 2001, and [that] Halliburton ha[d] met its burden of rebutting the Basic
presumption with respect to the corrective disclosure made on that date.” Id.
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would have certified a class as to December 4, 2001. The court’s decision not
to certify a class as to December 4, 2001, appears to be founded on event
study evidence plagued by methodological flaws.
V. Evidentiary Challenges to the Use of Event Studies in Securities
Litigation
The foregoing Parts have explained the role and methodology of event
studies and identified several adjustments required to make the event study
methodology reliable for addressing issues of price impact, materiality, loss
causation, and damages in securities fraud litigation. We turn, in this Part, to
the limitations of event studies—what they can and cannot prove. Although
event studies became popular because of the apparent scientific rigor that
they bring to analysis of the relationship between disclosures and stock price
movements, the question that they answer is not identical to the underlying
legal questions for which they are offered as evidence. In addition,
characteristics of real world disclosures may limit the ability of an event
study to determine the relationship between a specific disclosure and stock
price. Using demanding significance levels such as 5% also raises serious
questions about whether statistical and legal standards of proof conflict.
Finally, using event study methodology with a significance level of 5%
incorporates an implicit normative judgment about the relative importance of
Type I and Type II errors that masks an underlying policy judgment about
the social value of securities fraud litigation. These concerns have not
received sufficient attention by the courts that are using event studies to
decide securities cases.
A. The Significance of Insignificance
As commonly used by scholars, event studies answer a very specific type
of question: Was the stock price movement on the event date highly unusual?
More precisely, event studies ask whether it would have been very unlikely
to observe the excess return on the event date in the absence of some unusual
firm-specific event. In the case of a securities fraud event study, the firmspecific event is a fraudulent statement or a corrective disclosure.
Importantly, event study evidence of a highly unusual excess return
rebuts the null hypothesis of no price effect. But failure to rebut the null
hypothesis does not necessarily mean that a misrepresentation had no price
impact. An event date’s excess returns might be in the direction consistent
with the plaintiff’s allegations but be too small to be statistically significant
at a significance level as demanding as 5%. Failure to demonstrate this level
of statistical insignificance does not prove the null hypothesis, however;
rather, such failure simply implies that one does not reject the null hypothesis
at that significance level. That is, the standard event study does not show that
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the information did not affect stock price; it just shows that the information
did not have a statistically significant effect at the 5% level.227
This limitation raises several concerns. One is the appropriate legal
standard of proof when event study evidence is involved. To our knowledge,
the practice of requiring statistical significance at the 5% level at summary
judgment or trial has never been justified in terms of the applicable legal
standards of proof. These legal standards and the standard of statistical
significance at the 5% level may well not be consistent with each other.
Statistical significance concerns the unlikeliness of observing evidence if the
null hypothesis of no price impact is true, whereas legal standards for
adjudicating the merits are concerned with whether the null hypothesis is
more likely true or false. The implications of these observations are a subject
for future work. 228
A second concern is which party bears the burden of proof (whatever it
is). As Merritt Fox has explained, an open issue following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Halliburton II concerns the appropriate burden of proof
for a defendant seeking to rebut a plaintiff’s showing of price impact at the
class certification stage.229 If courts continue to regard the 5% level as the
right one for event studies, this distinction may be largely cosmetic. To the
extent that the plaintiff will have the burden of proof at summary judgment
or at trial to establish materiality, reliance, and causation, a plaintiff will need
to offer an event study that demonstrates a highly unusual price effect at that
time. In that case, the practical effects of imposing the burden of proof on the
defendant will be short-lived.230
This in turn introduces the third concern. To what extent should courts
consider additional evidence of price impact in a case in which even a wellconstructed event study is unlikely or unable to reject the null hypothesis?
We consider this question in more detail in subparts B and C below.
B. Dealing with Multiple Pieces of News on an Event Date
There are at least two additional ways in which the question answered by
an event study differs from the legally relevant question. First, event studies

227. See Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 587 (“Courts err because of their mistaken premise
that statistical insignificance indicates the probable absence of a price impact.”).
228. See generally Burtis, Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 124, at 1–3 (discussing the general
mismatch between legal standards and the statistical significance testing with a fixed significance
level).
229. See Fox, supra note 92, at 438.
230. We note that deferring the dismissal of a case to, say, summary judgment would create
some settlement value since both the prospect of summary judgment and the battle over class
certification involve litigation costs. We leave for another day a full discussion of the importance
of these costs in the long-running debate over the empirical importance of procedure in generating
the filing of low-merit cases.
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cannot determine whether the event in question caused the highly unusual
excess return.231 It is possible that (i) the stock did move an unusual amount
on the date in question but that (ii) some factor other than the event in
question was the cause of that move. For example, suppose that on the same
day that Halliburton made an alleged corrective disclosure, one of its major
customers announced for the first time that it was terminating activity in one
of the regions where it uses Halliburton’s services. The customer’s statement,
rather than Halliburton’s corrective disclosure, might be the cause of a drop
in stock price.
Second, it is possible that the event in question did cause a change in
stock price in the hypothesized direction, even when the estimated excess
return on the event date of interest was not particularly unusual because some
other factor operated in the opposite direction. For an example of this
situation, suppose that Halliburton made an alleged corrective disclosure on
the same date that a major customer announced good news for the company.
It is possible that customer’s announcement would fully or partially offset
the effect of the corrective disclosure, at least within the limits of the power
that appropriate statistical tests can provide. In that case, there will be no
highly unusual change in Halliburton’s stock price—no unusual estimated
excess return—even though the corrective disclosure reduced Halliburton’s
stock price ex hypothesi.
Both of these problems arise because an additional event occurs at the
same time as the legally relevant alleged event. We might term this additional
event a confounding event. 232 If multiple unusual events—events that would
affect the stock price even aside from any industry-wide or idiosyncratic
developments—occurred on the event date, then even an event study that
controls for market- or industry-level factors will be problematic. Suppose
our firm announced both favorable restructuring news and a big jury verdict
against it on the same day. All a traditional event study can measure is the
net market response to these two developments. Without further refinement,
it would not distinguish the sources of this response.
The event study methodology might be refined to deal with some
possible confounding events. For example, if the two pieces of information
were announced at different times on the same day, one might be able to use

231. Even if the event study were capable of identifying causality, it would not be able to
specifically determine the reasons for the causal reaction. Thus, as noted above, the correct response
to Justice Alito’s question at oral argument in Halliburton II, see Transcript of Oral Argument at
24, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13317), is that, by themselves, event studies are incapable of distinguishing between a rational and
irrational response to information.
232. See, e.g., Sherman v. Bear Stearns Cos. (In re Bear Stearns Cos., Sec., Derivative, &
ERISA Litig.), No. 09 Civ. 8161 (RWS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97784, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(discussing whether an event study controlled sufficiently for “confounding factors”).
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intraday price changes to parse the separate impacts of the two events. 233 Here
both the theory of and empirical evidence related to financial economics are
especially important. The theory suggests that stock prices should respond
rapidly in a public market with many traders paying attention to a well-known
firm with many shares outstanding. After all, no one wants to be left holding
a bag of bad news, and everyone can be expected to want to buy a stock for
which the issuer’s good news has yet to be reflected in price. These standard
market factors can be expected to put immediate pressure on a firm’s stock
price to move up in response to good news and down in response to bad news.
Empirical evidence suggests that financial economics theory is correct on this
point: one widely cited, if dated, study indicates that prices react within just
a few minutes to public news related to stock earnings and dividends. 234 As a
result, a study that looks at price movements during the day may be able to
separate out the effect of disclosures that took place at different times.
When multiple sources of news are released at exactly the same time,
however, no event study can by itself separate out the effects of the different
news. The event study can only tell us whether the net effect of all the news
was associated with an unusually large price drop or rise.
The results of the event study could still be useful if there is some way to
disentangle the expected effects of different types of news. For example,
suppose that a firm announces bad regulatory news on the same day that it
announces bad earnings news, with plaintiffs alleging only that the regulatory
news constitutes a corrective disclosure. Experts might be able to use
historical price and earnings data for the firm to estimate the relationship
between earnings news and the firm’s stock price. If this study controlled
appropriately for market expectations concerning the firm’s earnings (say,
using analysts’ predictions), it might provide a plausible way to separate out
the component of the event date’s estimated excess return that could
reasonably be attributed to the earnings news, with the rest being due to the
alleged corrective disclosure related to regulatory news. Alternatively,
experts might use quantitative content analysis, e.g., measuring the relative
frequencies of two types of news in headlines of articles published following
the news.235 While the release of multiple pieces of news on the same date
233. See Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 607 (discussing intraday event studies and citing In
re Novatel Wireless Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1218–21 (S.D. Cal. 2012), in which the court
held that an expert’s testimony as to such a study was admissible).
234. James M. Patell & Mark A. Wolfson, The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to
Earnings and Dividend Announcements, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 249–50 (1984). This study is cited,
for example, in the report of Halliburton’s expert witness Lucy Allen. Allen Report, supra note 147,
¶ 86 n.93. We note that if two pieces of news are released very close in time to each other, that
might raise special challenges related to the limited amount of trading typically seen in a short
enough window; this issue is beyond the scope of the present Article.
235. TABAK, supra note 10, at 13 (discussing a hypothetical scenario where the importance of
different news stories can be distinguished quantitatively).
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complicates the use of event studies to measure price impact, event studies
might be useful in at least some of those cases. On the other hand, as this
discussion suggests, an event study is likely to be incapable of definitively
resolving the question of price impact, and a court considering a case
involving confounding disclosures will have to determine the role of other
evidence in addressing the question.
Lurking in the shadows of this discussion is the question of why
information events might occur at the same time in a way that would
complicate the use of an event study. Although the presence of confounding
events could result from random chance, it could also be that an executive
shrewdly decides to release multiple pieces of information simultaneously. 236
Specifically, judicial reliance on event studies creates an incentive for issuers
and corporate officials to bundle corrective disclosures with other
information in a single press release or filing. If the presence of overlapping
news makes it difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to marshal admissible and
useful event study evidence, defendants may strategically structure their
disclosures to impede plaintiffs’ ability to establish price effect. The
possibility of such strategic behavior raises important questions about the
admissibility of non-event study evidence.
C. Power and Type II Error Rates in Event Studies Used in Securities Fraud
Litigation
The focus of courts and experts in evaluating event studies has been on
whether an event study establishes a statistically significant price impact at
the 5% level. As we discussed briefly in regard to Table 1 in subpart II(B),
supra, the 5% significance level requires that the Type I error rate be less
than 5%. But Type I errors are only one of two ways an event study can lead
to an erroneous inference. An event study leads to a Type II (false negative)
error when it fails to reject a null hypothesis that really is false—i.e., when it
fails to detect something unusual that really did happen on a date of interest.
As we discussed in subpart II(B), supra, for a given statistical test there
is a trade-off between Type I and Type II error rates—choosing to tolerate
fewer false positives necessarily creates more false negatives. Thus, by
insisting on a 5% Type I error rate, courts are implicitly insisting on both a
5% rate of false positives and some particular rate of false negatives. Recent
work has pointed out that in single-firm event studies used in securities

236. There is some evidence that corporate officials are able to reduce the cost of securities
litigation through the use of information bundling. Barbara A. Bliss, Frank Partnoy & Michael
Furchtgott, Information Bundling and Securities Litigation 2–4 (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper
No. 16-219, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795164 [https://perma.cc/9UJU-R54J].
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litigation, requiring a Type I error rate of only 5% yields an extremely high
Type II error rate.237
To illustrate, suppose that a corrective disclosure by an issuer actually
causes a price drop of 2%. We assume for simplicity that the issuer’s excess
returns are normally distributed with a standard deviation of 2%.238 A
properly executed event study that uses the 5% level will reject the null
hypothesis of no effect on that date only if the estimated excess return
represents a price drop of more than ‒1.645%. The probability that this will
occur when the true price effect is 2%—also known as the power of the test
against the specific alternative of a 2% true effect—is 57%.239 This means
that the Type II error rate is 43%.240 In other words, 43% of the time, the
event study will fail to find a statistically significant price impact. Notably,
this error rate is many times greater than the 5% Type I error rate.
As this example illustrates, the Type II error rate that results from
insisting on a Type I error rate of 5% can be quite high. Even leaving aside
the question of whether a 5% significance level is consistent with applicable
legal standards, we see no reason to assume that this significance level
reflects the normatively appropriate trade-off.241 The 5% Type I error rate is
traditionally used in the academic literature on financial economics, 242 but
there are numerous differences between those academic event studies and the
ones used in securities litigation. As we have already seen, the one-sided–
two-sided distinction is one such difference, as is the frequent existence of
multiple relevant event dates.
In addition, most academic event studies average event date excess
returns over multiple firms. This averaging often will both (i) greatly reduce
the standard deviation of the statistic that is used to test for statistical

237. See Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 597 (discussing the fact that the Type II error rate is
73.4% for a stock with normally distributed excess returns having a standard deviation of 1.5%,
when the true event-related price impact is a drop of 2%).
238. This magnitude for the standard deviation was not atypical in 2014. See, e.g., Brav &
Heaton, supra note 11, at 595 tbl.1 (showing that the average value of the standard deviation of
excess returns was 2% among firms for which standard deviations put them in the sixth decile of
4,298 firms studied for 2014).
239. Because the excess return is assumed normally distributed with standard deviation 2%, the
scaled random variable that equals one-half the excess return will have a normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation 1%. Since the corrective disclosure causes a 2% drop, the event
study described in the text will yield a finding of statistical significance whenever ‒1 plus this scaled
random variable is less than the ratio (‒1.645/2). The probability of that event—the test’s power in
this case—can be shown to equal 0.5704.
240. Since the probability of a Type II error is one minus the power of the test, the probability
of a Type II error is 0.4296, which implies a Type II error rate of 43%.
241. Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 176, at 368–72 (reaching this same conclusion).
242. See Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 599 n.31 (citing United States v. Hatfield, 795 F.
Supp. 2d 219, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), in which the court questioned whether it was appropriate to
apply a 95% confidence integral when using a preponderance standard).
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significance,243 and (ii) greatly reduce the importance of non-normality.244
Thus, the event studies typically of interest to scholars in their academic work
are atypical of event studies that are used in securities litigation. Whatever
the merits of the convention of insisting on a Type I error rate of 5% in
academic event studies, we think the use of that rate in securities litigation is
the result of happenstance and inertia rather than either attention to legal
standards or careful weighing of the costs and benefits of the trade-off in
Type I and Type II errors.
This observation suggests that the current approach to using event studies
in securities litigation warrants scrutiny. As long as courts continue to insist
on a Type I error rate of 5%,245 Type II error rates in securities litigation will
be very high. This means that event study evidence of a significant price
impact is much more convincing than event study evidence that fails to find
a significant price impact. To put it in evidence-law terms, at the current 5%
Type I error rate, a finding of significant price impact is considerably more
probative than a failure to find significant price impact.
That raises two questions. First, what Type I error rate should courts
insist on, and how should they determine that rate? Second, if event study
evidence against a significant price impact has limited probative value, does
that change the way courts should approach other evidence that is usually
thought to have limited probative value? For example, one approach might
be to allow financial-industry professionals to be qualified as experts for
purposes of testifying that an alleged corrective disclosure could be expected
to cause price impact, both for the class certification purposes on which we
have focused and as to other merits questions. The logic of this idea is simple:
when event study evidence fails to find a significant price impact, that
evidence has limited probative value, so the value of general, nonstatistical
expert opinions will be comparatively greater in such cases than in those
cases is which event study evidence does find a significant price impact. 246
These are complex questions that go to the core of the appropriate role of

243. See Brav & Heaton, supra note 11, at 604 (“[T]he standard deviation of a sample mean’s
distribution . . . falls as the number of observations reflected in the sample mean increases.”).
244. See Gelbach, Helland & Klick, supra note 19, at 509–10 (explaining and analyzing the
standard regression approach to estimating event effects).
245. See, e.g., In re Intuitive Surgical Sec. Litig., No. 5:13-cv-01920-EJD, 2016 WL 7425926,
at *15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (rejecting the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert based on a 90%
confidence level).
246. Further, such an approach would reduce the incentive for managers to release bad news
strategically in ways that would defeat the usefulness of event studies (see supra subpart V(B))
since doing so could open the door to more subjective expert testimony that is likely to be easy for
plaintiffs to obtain.
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event studies in securities fraud litigation and the appropriate choice of
significance level. 247
Conclusion
Event studies play an important role in securities fraud litigation. In the
wake of Halliburton II, that role will increase because proving price impact
has become a virtual requirement to secure class certification. This Article
has explained the event study methodology and explored a variety of
considerations related to the use of event studies in securities fraud litigation,
highlighting the ways in which the litigation context differs from the
empirical context of many academic event studies.
A key lesson from this Article is that courts and experts should pay more
attention to methodological issues. We identify four methodological
considerations and demonstrate how they can be addressed. First, because a
litigation-relevant event study typically involves only a single firm, issues
related to non-normality of a stock’s returns arise. Second, because the
plaintiff must show either that the price dropped or rose but will never carry
its burden if the opposite happened, experts should unquestionably be using
one-sided significance testing rather than the conventionally deployed twosided approach. Third, securities fraud litigation often involves multiple test
dates, which has important and tricky implications for the appropriate level
of date-specific confidence levels if the goal is an overall confidence level
equal to the 95% level, which courts and experts say it is. Fourth, event
studies must be modified appropriately to account for the possibility that
stock price volatility varies across time.
Even with these adjustments, event studies have their limits. We discuss
some evidentiary challenges that confront the use of event studies in
securities litigation. First, it is not clear that the 5% significance level is
appropriate in litigation. Second, failing to reject the null hypothesis is not
the same as proving that information did not have a price effect. As a result,
the legal impact of an event study may depend critically on which party bears
the burden of proof and the extent to which courts permit the introduction of
non-event study evidence on price impact. Third, both accidental and
strategic bundling of news may make event study evidence more difficult to
muster. Fourth, event studies used in securities litigation are likely to be
plagued by very high ratios of false negatives to false positives—that is, they
are much more likely to yield a lack of significant evidence of an actual price
impact than they are to yield significant evidence of price impact when there

247. A full discussion of the normative implications of the 5% Type I error rate is beyond the
scope of this Article. Two of us are presently working on this question in ongoing work.
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really was none. This imbalance of Type II and Type I error rates warrants
further analysis.

